United Nations A/67/963–S/2013/494

General Assembly
Security Council

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General Assembly
Sixty-seventh session
Agenda item 43
Question of Cyprus

Security Council
Sixty-eighth year

Letter dated 16 August 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 9 August 2013, addressed to you by Mehmet Dânâ, Representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (see annex).

I would be grateful if the text of the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 43, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Y. Halit Çevik
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

13-43294 (E) 210813

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Annex to the letter dated 16 August 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I am writing in response to the letter dated 18 July 2013, addressed to you by the Greek Cypriot representative in New York and circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council (A/67/940-S/2013/435), which yet again contains false claims of "infringements of international air traffic regulations and violations of the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by Turkey" and "the illegal use of closed ports by Turkish warships". In a manner stepping up its belligerent and provocative rhetoric at a time when the full-fledged negotiations for a comprehensive settlement are expected to resume between the two leaders in October, the said letter of the Greek Cypriot representative also included, for the first time, false allegations as regards the Ercan airport in the North.

In response to such pretentious allegations, I wish once again to reiterate that flights within the sovereign airspace of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus take place with the full knowledge and consent of the relevant authorities of the State, over which the Greek Cypriot Administration in South Cyprus has no jurisdiction or right of say whatsoever. It must be stated that assertions of so-called violations of air traffic regulations are unfounded, as the civil aviation authority of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is the sole competent authority to provide air traffic and aeronautical information services within its own national airspace. Similarly, the claim raised in the said letter in relation to Turkish Cypriot ports is also baseless, given that the Greek Cypriot Administration has no jurisdiction or right of say over Northern Cyprus. This constitutes yet another attempt aimed at distorting the facts and the realities of the island.

As noted in our previous letters, such allegations are based on the false and unlawful claim that the sovereignty of the Greek Cypriot Administration extends over the whole island, including the territory, national airspace and territorial waters of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. This pretentious contention by the Greek Cypriot side ignores the present realities on the ground, namely the existence of two independent, self-governing States on the island of Cyprus, each exercising sovereignty and jurisdiction within its respective territory.

As for the false claims regarding the Ercan airport in the North, it should be underlined that the technologically up-to-date Ercan area control centre and airport in North Cyprus have been providing successful and safe air traffic services since the Greek Cypriot refusal in 1977 to provide air traffic services in the northern part of the island in line with its isolation policy imposed on the Turkish Cypriot people.

Since then, all flights within the sovereign airspace of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus have taken place with the full knowledge and consent of its Civil Aviation Department, over which the Greek Cypriot Administration in South Cyprus has no jurisdiction or control. The legislation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus on aeronautical safety reflects all International Civil Aviation Organization standards and recommendations, providing safe, regular and swift navigation of aircraft landing at or taking off from Ercan airport, as well as using the airspace of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. All airports in Northern Cyprus are in full conformity with international standards, and necessary investments have been made

to keep up with the developing technology. The number of air traffic controllers has been increased in keeping with the increasing number of flights over the years, and the Ercan area control centre is constantly working in close cooperation with the Ankara area control centre in order to ensure the safe conduct of all flights in the region. In fact, each year more than 19,000 flights take place to and from Ercan airport, serving over 2 million passengers, including Greek Cypriots, and each day approximately 600 aircraft pass through the Ercan advisory airspace. In 2012 alone, 2,777,000 passengers used the Ercan airport. It is predicted that this number will be about 3,000,000 in 2013.

Continuous attempts by the Greek Cypriot side, through often-repeated false statements, to confer legitimacy on the long-defunct "Republic of Cyprus" are futile, since the Turkish Cypriot people will never give in to their unjust demands. What would indeed contribute to a better atmosphere on the island would be for the Greek Cypriot side to stop misappropriating for itself the rights and responsibilities that it does not legally have and to cease its hostile and derogatory acts against the Turkish Cypriot people. Moreover, the Greek Cypriot Administration should once again be reminded that its counterpart is, and has always been, the Turkish Cypriot side, not Turkey, and that its insistent denial of the Turkish Cypriot rights in the north of the island does not bode well for the prospects of finding a lasting settlement of the Cyprus conflict in line with the established United Nations parameters, which envisage a new partnership on the basis of the political equality of the two peoples of the island within the framework of a bizonal, bicommunal federation with two constituent States of equal status.

Availing myself of this opportunity, I would like to call upon the Greek Cypriot side to discontinue its well-known propaganda tactics, which are clearly not conducive to a positive atmosphere on the eve of the resumption, under your good offices mission, of the full-fledged negotiations between the two leaders for a comprehensive settlement in Cyprus. As the Turkish Cypriot side, on the other hand, we are committed to continuing to uphold our constructive and positive stance and encourage our Greek Cypriot neighbours to follow a similar path.

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 43, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mehmet **Dânâ**
Representative
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

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Security Council
Sixty-eighth year

Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development

The situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan

Elimination of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance

Promotion and protection of human rights

The rule of law at the national and international levels

Letter dated 15 August 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith the statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic in connection with the letter dated 24 July 2013 (A/67/943-S/2013/442) regarding the practice of banning foreign nationals from visiting Azerbaijan (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 34, 39, 67, 69 and 83, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Garen Nazarian
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

13-43276 (E) 260813

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Annex to the letter dated 15 August 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic

Authorities of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic have on numerous occasions expressed their grave concern over the fraudulent campaign by Azerbaijan aimed at distorting the essence of the conflict between Azerbaijan and Nagorno Karabakh and misleading the international community. This campaign expands from year to year, introducing new sophisticated methods of falsifications, provocations and revanchist threats.

The most recent examples of such propaganda campaign are the circulation of the 24 July 2013 letter (A/67/943-S/2013/442) in the United Nations, calling upon the Member States to warn their citizens against visiting the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic "without the prior authorization of the Government of Azerbaijan", as well as publication of a list of people declared *personae non gratae* by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan because of their visits to the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. The list of 335 individuals from 41 countries includes members of parliament, prominent public figures, culture and art professionals, journalists, students and tourists.

In this respect, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic deems appropriate to state the following:

The Nagorno-Karabakh Republic is an independent state with a population that should not be deprived of the possibility of exercising its fundamental human rights under any circumstances, as enshrined in article 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states that "no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty".

People of Nagorno Karabakh established their state exercising their inalienable right to self-determination in full compliance with the norms and principles of international law and acting upon the then effective constitutional and legal framework of the Soviet Union. Since the very first day of its establishment, the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, unlike Azerbaijan, has assumed the course of building a democratic State, ensuring all the rights and freedoms for its citizens. The Nagorno-Karabakh Republic leadership intends to continue the policy of comprehensive development of the Republic and its democratic institutions, and has repeatedly expressed its readiness for mutually beneficial cooperation with all interested parties.

From the very beginning, Azerbaijan rejected any possibility of a civilized dialogue with Nagorno Karabakh and adhered to the policy of settling the conflict between Azerbaijan and Nagorno Karabakh through the application of brutal, unproportional and indiscriminate force against the civilian population. It carried out ethnic cleansings in Nagorno Karabakh proper and Armenian-populated areas of Azerbaijan, unleashing full-fledged military aggression against Nagorno Karabakh.

Despite the ongoing negotiation process and commitments undertaken since the conclusion of the ceasefire agreement, the Azeri leadership continues to interpret selectively the norms and principles of international law, thus escalating tension and mistrust, as well as ignoring the existing realities. Deluded by its language of threats and hostility, Azerbaijan has made a step forward in the wrong direction, and threatens sanctions against third-country nationals visiting the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. Such a policy of Azerbaijan fits perfectly into the logic of its domestic human rights record that it is striving to impose upon foreign citizens.

These highly irresponsible steps thwart any attempts to establish an atmosphere of trust between the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic and the Republic of Azerbaijan, which would be essential for the peaceful resolution of the conflict. They also hinder the ongoing mediation efforts by the Minsk Group Co-Chairs of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe to find a comprehensive and lasting solution to the conflict between Azerbaijan and Nagorno Karabakh.

Meanwhile, it is worth mentioning that in spite of the artificial impediments created by the Azeri side, the number of tourists visiting the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic steadily grows: throughout its independent history, tens of thousands of foreign citizens have already visited the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, which attests to the safe and secure environment established by the freedom-loving people of Nagorno Karabakh, and growing international interest in the rich cultural and historical heritage of our native land. It is essential to note that the crime rate in the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic is one of the lowest in Europe, and no serious accident has ever been registered in our country with participation of a foreign citizen.

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic urges the authorities of Azerbaijan to abandon counterproductive attempts to hinder visits of foreign nationals to the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, and direct its energy and resources, wasted on such groundless and provocative actions, towards settlement of substantial issues between the parties to the conflict, thus promoting peace and stability for the whole fragile region of the South Caucasus.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic welcomes and encourages the visits of foreign nationals, both officials and tourists, to the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. Such visits and people-to-people contacts in general contribute to the creation of an atmosphere of confidence and cooperation in the region and are essential for the international community to get truthful and objective information about the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic.

Stepanakert, 14 August 2013

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Agenda items 34 and 39

Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development

The situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan

Security Council
Sixty-eighth year

Letter dated 16 August 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I draw your attention to the fact that Azerbaijan is consistently and tendentiously attempting to mislead the States Members of the United Nations regarding the ceasefire violations along the Armenia-Azerbaijan border and the line of contact with the Nagorno Karabakh Republic.

In this regard, I attach hereto the results of the comparative analysis for the month of April 2013 (see annex, table 1), which clearly demonstrate that, of the 262 incidents reported by Azerbaijan during the month of April, only 43 coincide with the operational data of the armed forces of the Republic of Armenia.

The Azerbaijani side continued to overstate the number of incidents reported for the month of May 2013 (see annex, table 2) and presented exaggerated data of ceasefire violations. This time again, of the 246 incidents, only 14 coincide with the operational data of the Armenian side.

Armenia reiterates its call to Azerbaijan to refrain from this unimpressive exercise and other propaganda steps and to act constructively in support of the efforts of the Minsk Group Co-Chairs of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, aimed at reaching a viable resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh issue.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 34 and 39, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Garen **Nazarian**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

13-43288 (E) 270813

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Annex to the letter dated 16 August 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Table 1

Comparison of the information reported to the United Nations by the Republic of Azerbaijan and the operational data of the armed forces of the Republic of Armenia concerning the ceasefire violations for April 2013

No.	*Date*	*Specified time by the Republic of Azerbaijan*	*Specified time by the Republic of Armenia*	*Direction of the shot*	*Type of weapon specified by the Republic of Azerbaijan*	*Type of weapon specified by the Republic of Armenia*	*Specified result by the Republic of Azerbaijan*	*Specified result by the Republic of Armenia*
1.	01.04	23:25-23:40	12:35	Jraberd	AK	AK	–	–
2.		23:25-23:40	11:25	N. Karmiraghbyur	AK	AK	–	–
3.	02.04	18:50-18:55	21:30	Kuropatkino	AK	AK	–	–
4.	03.04	13:20-13:35	07:35	N. Karmiraghbyur	AK	AK	–	–
5.		17:50-18:00	17:10		AK	AK	–	–
6.	04.04	17:10-17:20	17:30	Kuropatkino	AK	AK	–	–
7.	05.04	12:45-12:50	10:45-11:25		AK	PK	–	–
8.		12:45-12:50	12:50		AK	DSHK, AK, SVD	–	–
9.		12:45-12:50	11:45		AK	Sev net	–	–
10.		15:25-15:40	12:00		AK	Sev net	–	–
11.		15:25-15:40	13:05		AK	Sev net	–	–
12.		15:25-15:40	13:47	Kuropatkino	AK	AK	–	–
13.	07.04	23:35-23:40	09:50	Marzili	SVD	AK	–	–
14.		23:35-23:40	18:40		SVD	AK	–	–
15.	07.04	20:45-20:55	21:58	Kuropatkino	PK	AK	–	–
16.			22:26		AK	AK	–	–
17.			23:30-23:40		AK	AK	–	–
18.	08.04	10:35-10:50 21:45-22:00	19:35	Aghashi Veysali	AK	RPK	–	–
19.		19:40-19:45	18:40	Marzili	AK	AK Sev net	–	–
20.							–	–
21.		22:00-22:10	23:55		AK	AK	–	–

No.	Date	Specified time by the Republic of Azerbaijan	Specified time by the Republic of Armenia	Direction of the shot	Type of weapon specified by the Republic of Azerbaijan	Type of weapon specified by the Republic of Armenia	Specified result by the Republic of Azerbaijan	Specified result by the Republic of Armenia
22.	10.04	20:00	03:35-03:40	Kengerli	SVD	AK	–	–
23.		04:20-04:30	21:55	Aghashi Abduraghmanli	AK	PK	–	–
24.		23:45-23:50	16:15	Kuropatkino	AK	AK	–	–
25.		17:10-17:20	19:30	Marzili	AK	Sev net	–	–
26.	12.04	02:45-02:50	00:40	Kuropatkino	SVD	AK	–	–
27.		02:45-02:50	01:20		SVD	AK	–	–
28.		15:15-15:20	14:40		SVD	Sev net	–	–
29.		15:15-15:20	22:10		SVD	AK	–	–
30.	14.04	14:50-15:05	15:40		DSHK	AK	–	–
31.		14:50-15:05	23:33		DSHK	AK	–	–
32.	16.04	06:05-06:10	22:32		AK	AK PK	–	–
33.	17.04	21:55-22:00	16:45	Marzili	SVD	AK	–	–
34.	20.04	20:55-21:15	18:12	Kuropatkino	AK	Sev net	–	–
35.	21.04	18:50-18:55	23:50		AK	AK	–	–
36.	24.04	03:20-03:25	02:26		AK	PK	–	–
37.	26.04	01:55-02:00	20:55		SVD	AK	–	–
38.			19:25		SVD	AK	–	–
39.	28.04	22:20-22:25	14:50	Aghashi Veysali	AK	SVD PK	–	–
40.			20:47	Aghashi Veysali	AK	RPK	–	–
41.		12:15-12:20	22:45	Kuropatkino	AK	AK	–	–
42.			13:27		AK	SVD	–	–
43.		06:10-06:20	13:55	Talish	AK	SVD	–	–

AK — Kalashnikov rifle
PK — Kalashnikov machine gun
SVD — 7.9 mm sniper weapon
DSHK — 12.7 mm machine gun
RPK — 5.45 mm machine gun
Sev net — 12.7 mm sniper weapon

A/67/965
S/2013/497

Table 2

Comparison of the information reported to the United Nations by the Republic of Azerbaijan and the operational data of the armed forces of the Republic of Armenia concerning the ceasefire violations for May 2013

No.	*Date*	*Specified time by the Republic of Azerbaijan*	*Specified time by the Republic of Armenia*	*Direction of the shot*	*Type of weapon specified by the Republic of Azerbaijan*	*Type of weapon specified by the Republic of Armenia*	*Specified result by the Republic of Azerbaijan*	*Specified result by the Republic of Armenia*
1.	01.05	22:15-22:20	21:50	Kuropatkino	AK	AK	–	–
2.	08.05	02:00-02:05	03:55		AK	AK	–	–
3.	09.05	01:20-01:30	02:20		AK	AK	–	–
4.	09.05	04:25-04:30	11:30		AK	AK	–	–
5.	11.05	06:00-06:15	12:50		AK	AK	–	–
6.	14.05	14:50-14:55	07:20	Marzili	DSHK	SVD	–	–
7.	16.05	12:15-12:20	09:15	Bash Qarvend	AK	RPK	–	–
8.	24.05	18:28-18:35	18:25	Marzili	AK	Sev net	–	–
9.	25.05	14:55-15:15	19:15	Kuropatkino	AK	AK	–	–
10.	27.05	03:30-03:40	20:25	Mehdili	AK	AK	–	–
11.	29.05	14:40-15:05	13:40	Jraberd	AK	PK	–	–
12.		17:20-17:35	16:40		AK	RPG-7	–	–
13.		18:20-18:40	18:10		AK RPG-7	SAKO	–	–
14.	31.05	06:00-06:10	17:35	Kengerli	AK	PK	–	–

AK — Kalashnikov rifle
PK — Kalashnikov machine gun
SVD — 7.9 mm sniper weapon
DSHK — 12.7 mm machine gun
RPK — 5.45 mm machine gun
Sev net — 12.7 mm sniper weapon
RPG-7 — anti-tank rocket-propelled grenade launcher
SAKO — sniper rifle

United Nations A/67/966

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Sixty-seventh session
Agenda item 83
The rule of law at the national and international levels

Letter dated 16 August 2013 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Costa Rica to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to write to you in reference to statements made by the President of the Republic of Nicaragua, Daniel Ortega, which seriously threaten Costa Rica's integrity and sovereignty and violate fundamental principles of international law.

In that respect, I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of the protest note dated 14 August 2013 from Gioconda Ubeda Rivera, Minister for Foreign Affairs a.i. of Costa Rica addressed to Samuel Santos López, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Nicaragua (see annex).

I request that the content of the present letter and its annex be circulated to all States Members of the United Nations as a document of the sixty-seventh session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 83.

(*Signed*) Saúl **Weisleder**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

13-43675 (E) 260813 260813

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Annex to the letter dated 16 August 2013 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Costa Rica to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Yesterday, 13 August 2013, the President of the Republic of Nicaragua, Daniel Ortega, delivered an address marking the thirty-third anniversary of Nicaragua's Naval Force, in which, he said, inter alia, that Nicaragua intended to reclaim sovereignty over the Costa Rican province of Guanacaste, and that he was considering bringing a case before the International Court of Justice for that purpose.

Such statements by the President of Nicaragua severely damage relations between our two nations. They constitute a serious disavowal of and disregard for the Treaty of Limits between Costa Rica and Nicaragua of July 1858, the basic instrument governing relations between Costa Rica and Nicaragua. The President of Nicaragua is well aware that his country has clearly recognized the province of Guanacaste as Costa Rican territory for more than a century and a half, pursuant to that treaty. The President of the sister Republic of Nicaragua also knows that the International Court of Justice explicitly acknowledged that fact in its judgment of 13 July 2009: "The 1858 Treaty of Limits fixed the course of the boundary between Costa Rica and Nicaragua from the Pacific Ocean to the Caribbean Sea. According to the boundary thus drawn the district of Nicoya lay within the territory of Costa Rica" (*Dispute regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2009*, p. 213). These extremely serious statements by President Ortega are in no way conducive to the peaceful and harmonious coexistence which Costa Ricans and Nicaraguans want.

My country and my Government deplore this new offensive stance adopted by Nicaragua, which reflects that country's policy of disavowal of and disregard for the 1858 Treaty of Limits, a policy that has already been demonstrated by its occupation of and subsequent claim over a portion of Costa Rican territory in Isla Portillos and the violation of Costa Rica's long-standing right of free navigation on the San Juan River, among others. Threats like those of yesterday against the integrity and sovereignty of Costa Rica openly violate not only the 1858 Cañas-Jerez Treaty of Limits but also fundamental principles of international law, including respect for territorial integrity and stability of borders. Moreover, they deeply harm the historical ties shared by our two nations and severely aggravate the outstanding disputes between them.

Consequently, my Government hereby protests, in the strongest possible terms, and demands that Nicaragua cease all attempts to claim Costa Rican territory and that it fully comply with the legal instruments governing our border and neighbourly relations.

As my Government has previously demonstrated, it has been willing to enter into a frank dialogue that would lead to concrete results, but such dialogue must be subject to Nicaragua's full compliance with the decisions of the International Court of Justice and with international law.

Costa Rica is willing to enter into a dialogue on the situation of maritime spaces in the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean. Costa Rica is willing to listen to what Nicaragua has to bring to the negotiating table, but it will not in any way allow the existing borders and border regime to be called into question, or agree to be

compelled to enter into any negotiations over the indisputable territory of the Republic of Costa Rica.

I wish to point out to the Government of Nicaragua that the extremely serious statements made by its President aggravate the dispute which Costa Rica submitted to the International Court of Justice on 18 November 2010 and violate the provisional measures indicated by that Court in its judgment of 8 March 2011.

(*Signed*) Gioconda **Ubeda Rivera**
Minister a.i.

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Sixty-eighth year

Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development

The situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan

Elimination of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance

Promotion and protection of human rights

The rule of law at the national and international levels

Letter dated 16 August 2013 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I wish to refer to the letter of the Permanent Representative of Armenia, dated 1 July 2013 (A/67/924-S/2013/396), which is a clumsy attempt to react to the brief research previously submitted for your consideration (A/67/875-S/2013/313) on the non-compliance by the Republic of Armenia with United Nations Security Council resolutions 822 (1993), 853 (1993), 874 (1993) and 884 (1993). It is clear that Armenia is once again opposing the facts which point to its policy of aggression, hostility and hatred, outright lies and falsification.

Thus, in the words of the Permanent Representative of Armenia, Azerbaijan "makes desperate attempts to distort and misinterpret the Security Council resolutions of 1993 and the subsequent presidential statements, as well as the statements and comments of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Secretary-General of the United Nations and Member States pertinent to the Nagorno-Karabakh issue". Such a deduction is obviously not only unproven but is also easily refuted by the aforementioned research, which is based on official United Nations and Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)/Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) documents and also statements by Member States represented in the Security Council. The documents in question prove the unsubstantiated nature of the Armenian version of events and testify to the intentional non-fulfilment by Yerevan of the requirements

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of the Security Council resolutions, and its determined efforts to undermine the process of settling the conflict on the basis of international law. A comparative analysis of the primary sources of these documents and the explanation thereof in the research is sufficient to be convinced that the Permanent Representative of Armenia in essence is accusing not Azerbaijan, but the United Nations Secretary-General, the members of the Security Council, the OSCE governing bodies and the international community as a whole of "inexpensive narratives" and "lies".

The Permanent Representative of Armenia asserts that "the essence of the problem lies in the exercise by the people of Nagorno-Karabakh of their inalienable right to self-determination" and the conflict allegedly broke out owing to "coercive policies" of Azerbaijan in response to this requirement. The Armenian diplomat gets so carried away that he accuses Azerbaijan of carrying out "military aggression against the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh" which was also allegedly "condemned by the international community". The letters and statements by Armenian officials leave no doubt that they perceive the role, place and obligations of their country, as a member of the United Nations, in an extremely inappropriate manner. Otherwise, the Permanent Representative of Armenia would not have had to imagine that the international community condemned the "aggression of Azerbaijan against Nagorno-Karabakh". He would also have been able to notice that the Security Council not only did not mention, in any of its four resolutions or in any of the New York statements of its President, the existence of "the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh", "the people of Nagorno-Karabakh", its "right to self-determination" and "military aggression" on the part of Azerbaijan, but rather condemned the use of force in relation to Azerbaijan and the occupation of its territory; confirmed respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and the inviolability of its international borders; confirmed that the region of Daghlyq-Garabagh (Nagorny-Karabakh) is a part of Azerbaijan; and demanded the immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of the occupying forces from all occupied territories (resolutions 822 (1993), 853 (1993), 874 (1993) and 884 (1993)).

In his attempts to mislead the United Nations community, the Permanent Representative of Armenia asserts that in the aforementioned brief research Azerbaijan appears unable to cite any Security Council document adopted after the ceasefire declared on 12 May 1994 which demands the withdrawal of Armenian forces from occupied Azerbaijani territories. In order to prove the absurdity of this kind of view and the conclusions based on it, it is sufficient to refer to paragraphs 22 and 23 of the research, which recall the statement made by the President of the Security Council on 26 April 1995. In this document, the Council reaffirmed, "all its relevant resolutions, inter alia, on the principles of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all States in the region", and also the "inviolability of international borders and the inadmissibility of the use of force for the acquisition of territory". As is well known, the resolutions to which the President of the Security Council refers in his statement of 26 April 1995 contain the unambiguous requirement to withdraw the occupying forces from all the occupied territories of Azerbaijan. It is also clear that Armenia has single-mindedly ignored all the key Security Council instructions regarding the principles of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States, and also the inviolability of international borders. The letter that from the Permanent Representative of Armenia is further proof of that.

In addition to contradicting irrefutable facts and documents produced by international organizations, the arguments of the Permanent Representative of

Armenia are not consistent with the declarations made by the most senior leaders of his own country, however surprising that may seem. Thus, the President of Armenia, Serge Sarkissian, publicly acknowledged that the war was started by Armenia and that the aim of the war was to fulfil the long nurtured plan of seizing Azerbaijani territory. Moreover, he made it unequivocally clear that during the active military phase of the conflict, it was Armenia that intentionally ignored the demands of the Security Council for the immediate cessation of all military activities and hostile acts for the purposes of establishing a stable ceasefire. In reality, at the very time when there was a real possibility of halting the bloodshed and saving the lives of thousands of people, the leaders of Armenia and the separatist regime which it had created in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan followed a different line of reasoning. Anyone who wishes to be convinced that the words of the President of Armenia are not the "inexpensive narratives" of Azerbaijani propaganda may refer to his 15 December 2000 interview with the British journalist Thomas de Waal (http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/02/04/president-interview-and-tragic-anniversary/9vpa). The following response by Mr. Sarkissian to the question of whether he regrets the deaths of thousands of people is also revealing: "I do not regret anything at all", because "such upheavals are necessary, even if it costs thousands of lives". Of course, in this context, the arguments of the Permanent Representative of Armenia concerning the "aggression of Azerbaijan" and the "provocative acts" of my country are merely absurd and demonstrate an absence of responsibility.

The comments made by the Armenian diplomat concerning human rights and democracy in Azerbaijan do not withstand criticism. With a wealth of experience and skills in its bloody reprisals against the peaceful Azerbaijani population during the conflict, the most senior leaders of Armenia have, on more than one occasion, resorted to the cruellest methods of dealing with political opponents inside their own country. There are more than sufficient facts to prove this. In addition, the appropriate United Nations bodies have repeatedly expressed their concern at the spirit of intolerance which reigns in Armenia, and its policy and practice of discrimination against ethnic and religious minorities, refugees, asylum seekers, women and children.

In order to cover up the results of the unlawful use of force and ethnic cleansing, the Permanent Representative of Armenia again refers to the principle of the right of peoples to self-determination. In reality, notwithstanding the concept of self-determination adopted in international law, Yerevan is attempting to impose the view that this principle may be applied in the form of unilateral secession for the Armenian ethnic minority living in Azerbaijan. The danger associated with this is obvious. An irresponsible approach of this kind is contrary to the true value of self-determination, threatens the unity of all multinational societies and in essence provides clear encouragement for the spread of discrimination and intolerance on racial, ethnic and religious grounds.

The demands of Yerevan for the secession of part of the territory of a neighbouring State with the native ethnic group living there sound all the more strange in the light of the fact that, unlike Azerbaijan and other States in the region, Armenia is a uniquely monoethnic country, having achieved that shameful position by expelling all non-Armenians, including Azerbaijanis. Armenia is also conducting a similar openly racist policy in the region of Daglyqh-Garabagh and in other occupied Azerbaijani territories. Thus, the unscrupulous nature of Armenia's motives is perfectly clear, since it baselessly insists on ethnic-based privileges for

the Armenian minority through the discriminatory flouting of the fundamental rights and freedoms of the significantly more numerous Azerbaijani population.

Furthermore, it is a well known fact that, in accordance with international law, the principle of self-determination applies in reality to three categories of peoples, namely, (a) peoples of sovereign States; (b) peoples of colonially formed territorial units; and (c) peoples under foreign domination, subjugation and exploitation, including peoples under foreign military occupation. There is no doubt that the members of the Armenian ethnic minority group living in the region of Daglyqh-Garabagh do not fit into any of these categories of peoples and will never be considered an independent subject with the right to self-determination. By contrast, Armenia itself has committed aggression, has expelled hundreds of thousands of people from their places of permanent residence, has occupied Azerbaijani territories, has committed the most serious international crimes during the war which it unleashed and has committed gross violations of the right to self-determination of the people of Azerbaijan.

As is well known, in its advisory opinion of 22 July 2010, the International Court of Justice confirmed the illegality of unilateral secession which is connected with the unlawful use of force or other egregious violations of norms of international law, in particular those of a peremptory character (*jus cogens*). Consequently, the claims made by Armenia, which resorted to the illegal use of force to seize the territory of Azerbaijan and committed the most serious international crimes, including war crimes, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing and even genocide, run counter to the norms of international law and are without foundation.

Officials from Armenia often portray their own thoughts on international legal norms and the peace process as allegedly reflecting the position of the international mediators who are the Co-Chairmen of the OSCE Minsk Group. Further convincing proof of this is provided by consulting the letter of the Permanent Representative of Armenia of 1 July 2013. At the same time, it is readily apparent that Armenia fails to mention the fact that, in its proposals regarding principles for the settlement of the conflict, the same international mediators refer to the 1975 Helsinki Final Act which, inter alia, instructs participating States to "respect the equal rights of peoples and their right to self-determination, acting at all times in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with the relevant norms of international law, including those relating to territorial integrity of States". In actual reality, Armenia has never observed this fundamental obligation and has committed gross violations of international legal norms and principles, including primarily those which relate to the right of peoples to self-determination and the territorial integrity of States.

Thus, the principles of the non-use of force or the threat of force and the territorial integrity of States, as well as the right to self-determination in the context of the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, are aimed at resolving the main issues connected with the liberation of the occupied Azerbaijani territories, the fulfilment by peoples forcibly expelled from their homes of the inalienable right to return and the establishment of relations between two States, on the basis of respect for territorial integrity, the inviolability of international borders and non-interference in each other's internal affairs.

More anecdotal in nature in the letter of the Permanent Representative of Armenia is the consideration of the reasons which have allegedly caused the Security Council to cease adoption of further resolutions on the conflict. According to the highly original logic of the Armenian diplomat, this has allegedly happened because the violation of the resolutions adopted has diminished their significance, undermined the authority of the Security Council and rendered its resolutions ineffective. Obviously, such a judgement is evidence of the uninformed position of the Armenian ambassador not only regarding the circumstances of his State, but also concerning the functions and powers of the Security Council, which, according to the Charter of the United Nations, has primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. In addition, the reality is that Armenia openly acknowledges the logic it is following, ignoring the resolutions of the Security Council, which apparently out of concern for its own authority can simply refuse to fulfil its duties and exercise its prerogatives if the decisions it takes are not implemented. The opinion expressed by Armenia, which has finally come to believe in the principle of impunity, may in essence also be considered an open call to discard the existing system and principles of international law.

The conclusion is self-evident. In reality, by ignoring the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly, continuing the illegal occupation of Azerbaijani territories, conducting a policy of hostility and hatred, and denying the right of more than one million Azerbaijani refugees and internally displaced persons to return to their homes, Armenia is opposing the settlement of the conflict in accordance with the fundamental norms and principles of international law, and pursuing the aim of colonization and annexation of Azerbaijani lands. There is no doubt that such an approach has absolutely no chance of success. The region of Daglyqh-Garabagh is an inalienable part of Azerbaijan, and the only way to resolve existing problems, achieve a settlement of the conflict and establish civilized relations between two neighbouring States is to put a stop to the occupation of Azerbaijani territories, fully re-establish the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, and immediately provide for compliance with the inalienable right of refugees and internally displaced persons to return to their homes.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly under agenda items 34, 39, 67, 69 and 83, and also as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Tofig **Musayev**
Deputy Permanent Representative
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

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Sixty-eighth year

Identical letters dated 14 August 2013 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I transmit herewith a statistical summary of Israeli violations of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) committed in June 2013 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex issued as an official document of the sixty-seventh session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 36, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Caroline **Ziade**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

13-45752 (E) 270813 030913

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Annex to the identical letters dated 14 August 2013 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Land violations

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
1 June 2013	0800	An Israeli enemy patrol comprising two Hummer vehicles, a Land Rover and a Kaminkar moved from the Ghajar bridge to the area opposite the Wazzani observation point, where 20 soldiers stepped out, opened the gate and crossed the technical fence to the area opposite the Wazzani Fort resort. At 0920 hours, the patrol headed back to the Ghajar bridge position.
	2240	An Israeli enemy patrol comprising three Hummer vehicles moved from the Ghajar bridge position to the area opposite the Wazzani observation point, where two soldiers stepped out, opened the gate and crossed the technical fence to the area opposite the Wazzani Fort resort. At 2300 hours, the patrol returned to the Ghajar bridge position.
2 June 2013	1218	A member of an Israeli enemy patrol opposite point B83 (Kafr Killa) trained his weapon on the driver of a vehicle that happened to be passing on the Lebanese side.
3 June 2013	0945	An Israeli enemy patrol comprising four Hummer vehicles, three Land Rover vehicles and a civilian car moved from the Ghajar bridge position to the area opposite the Lebanese Army observation point of Wazzani, where 16 soldiers stepped out and opened the gate. Eight of them crossed the technical fence to the area opposite the Wazzani Fort resort and measured the dimensions of the area. At 1315 hours, the patrol returned into occupied territory.
	1600	An Israeli enemy patrol comprising a Hummer vehicle moved from a position east of Maysat to the area opposite the Lebanese Army observation point of Wazzani, where five soldiers stepped out and opened the gate. Three of them crossed the technical fence by some 40 metres, reaching a point opposite the Wazzani Fort resort. At 1635 hours, the patrol left for the Ghajar bridge position.
4 June 2013	0930	An Israeli enemy patrol comprising three Merkava tanks moved to the area opposite the Lebanese Army observation point of Wazzani, where five soldiers stepped out and opened the gate. Three of the soldiers and two of the tanks crossed the technical fence by some 40 metres. The third tank took up a position overlooking the Wazzani Fort resort.
	1052	An Israeli enemy Merkava tank trained its cannon on the Lebanese Army position of Markaba.
5 June 2013	1345	An Israeli enemy patrol comprising two Hummer vehicles and three Land Rover vehicles moved into the area opposite the Lebanese Army observation point of Wazzani, where three soldiers stepped out, opened the gate, crossed the technical fence and approached the riverbank.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
8 June 2013	1020	An Israeli enemy patrol comprising a Hummer and five Land Rover vehicles, one of them equipped with a surveillance camera, drove up to the gate opposite the Lebanese Army observation point of Wazzani, where 20 soldiers stepped out, opened the gate and crossed the technical fence by some 50 metres.
10 June 2013	0830	An Israeli enemy Merkava tank crossed the technical fence opposite the Wazzani resorts, positioning itself behind the berm, followed by four trucks, a Falasha construction machine and a roller. Some workers paved the road that the Israeli enemy had recently damaged, accompanied by a hostile patrol comprising three Hummer vehicles and three Land Rover vehicles. At 1600 hours, work stopped and they left the site.
11 June 2013	0800	An Israeli enemy foot patrol comprising 11 soldiers entered the Wazzani area opposite the Lebanese Army observation point, where its members opened the gate and crossed the technical fence into the work site in the above-mentioned area.
12 June 2013	1400	An Israeli enemy patrol comprising nine soldiers accompanied by a police dog in the area opposite the town of Abbasiyah crossed the technical fence by some 80 metres within the territory with regard to which Lebanon maintains a claim.
13 June 2013	0445	Powerful explosions and bursts of medium machine-gun fire were heard within the occupied Shab'a Farms.
14 June 2013	0800	Two Israeli enemy Merkava tanks positioned themselves behind the berm opposite the Lebanese Army observation point in the Wazzani area, followed by another patrol comprising two Hummer vehicles and a Defender, at which point six soldiers stepped out and crossed the technical fence onto the road that the enemy had previously repaired. At 0945 hours, the Merkava tank crossed the technical fence and positioned itself on the hill opposite the observation point.
	1100 1150	Bursts of medium machine-gun fire were heard near the Radar position within the occupied Shab'a Farms.
	1130	While Lebanese citizen Fadi Rabah Awadah was fishing within Lebanese territory on the west bank of the Wazzani river, some 400 metres from the Wazzani Fort in the direction of the Roman bridge, nine Israeli enemy soldiers lowered themselves into the river, crossed the withdrawal line and fired at him without hitting him. They took the fishing equipment that was with him.
16 June 2013	2050, 2100	Several explosions were heard within the occupied Shab'a Farms while a helicopter flew overhead.
19 June 2013	1710	An Israeli enemy patrol comprising a Merkava tank, two Hummer vehicles and a Land Rover moved into the area opposite the Lebanese Army observation point in the Wazzani area, where 15 soldiers stepped out of their vehicles and crossed the technical fence. The tank followed them, positioning itself behind the berm and training its cannon on Lebanese territory. The soldiers deployed along the length of the road that had recently been repaired.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
20 June 2013	2200 2300	The Israeli enemy fired three flares over the Radar position within the occupied Shab'a Farms.
21 June 2013	2205	Two Israeli enemy soldiers near the Hanita area within occupied Palestinian territory directed a searchlight towards the Lebanese Army position for approximately one minute.
22 June 2013	1010	An Israeli enemy patrol comprising a Land Rover went into the Wazzani area opposite the Lebanese Army observation point, where two soldiers stepped out. The patrol was followed by a Merkava tank that crossed the technical fence and positioned itself behind one of the hills in the area.
24 June 2013	1545	Two Israeli enemy Merkava tanks positioned themselves on the hill opposite a Lebanese Army position in Kafr Shuba and trained their cannons on Lebanese territory.
	1850	Three members of an Israeli enemy patrol trained their weapons on Lebanese Army soldiers near point TP37 (Udaysah).
	2345	The Israeli enemy fired three flares over the Radar position. Three explosions were heard within the occupied Shab'a Farms.
26 June 2013	1040	An Israeli enemy patrol stopped at the separation wall opposite Kafr Killa and its members loaded their weapons in the direction of a Lebanese Army patrol.
27 June 2013	0600	A group of Israeli enemy soldiers was seen departing from the area between Duhayrah and Alma al-Sha'b. The group had been positioned north of the Blue Line opposite 1-BP7, in violation of Lebanese sovereignty by a distance of some 50 metres.
29 June 2013	2145	From the Labbunah-Jall al-Alam position, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight towards Lebanese Army military equipment in Labbunah for approximately one minute.

Sea violations

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
6 June 2013	2050	An Israeli enemy launch directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters in the region of buoy No. 5 for 20 seconds.
11 June 2013	1135 1140	An Israeli enemy launch crossed the line of buoys by some 100 metres within Lebanese territorial waters north of buoy No. 6. The launch then returned to occupied Palestinian territorial waters south of the line of buoys.
	1410	An Israeli enemy launch crossed the line of buoys by some 10 metres within Lebanese territorial waters next to buoy No. 2. The launch then returned to occupied Palestinian territorial waters south of the line of buoys.
12 June 2013	1000	Three Israeli enemy launches on the open sea at the line of buoys opposite Ra's Naqurah installed two new buoys along the line of buoys beyond buoy No. 8.

Air violations

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
1 June 2013	0930	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South, Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 1830 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
2 June 2013	0645	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South, Riyaq, Baalbek and Zahlah before leaving at 1440 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0900	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South, Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 2100 hours over Kafr Killa.
	0920	Four Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1100 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
3 June 2013	0730	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South and the Western Bekaa before leaving at 1710 hours over Naqurah.
	0745	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Aytarun. It circled over the South before leaving at 2120 hours over Naqurah.
	1505	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1635 hours over Kafr Killa.
	2100 2145	Two Israeli enemy helicopters were seen dropping approximately 20 heat balloons off Tyre. Two helicopters were seen over Kafra town, and two other helicopters were seen over the sea off Naqurah.
4 June 2013	0435	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 0720 hours over Naqurah.
	0655	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs before leaving at 1740 hours over Naqurah.
	1030	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 1915 hours over Rumaysh.
	1215	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea off Shikka. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1335 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	2355	An Israeli enemy helicopter violated Lebanese airspace, circling over Lebanese territorial waters off Tyre.
5 June 2013	1005	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 1500 hours over Rumaysh.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1010	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 1800 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1030	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South and the Western Bekaa before leaving at 2015 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1215	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea off Beirut. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1345 hours over Rumaysh.
	1620 1630	A foreign object was seen circling above Shab'a town towards the Radar position in the occupied Shab'a Farms. A black and white appendage was attached to the lowest part of the object.
6 June 2013	0615	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 1315 hours over Kafr Killa.
	0630	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 1940 hours over Naqurah.
	1220	Four Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1315 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1405	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1600 hours over Aytarun.
7 June 2013	0715	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 1615 hours over Kafr Killa.
	0715	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Aytarun. It circled over the South before leaving at 1810 hours over Rumaysh.
	1055	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1230 hours over the occupied Shab'a Farms.
8 June 2013	0610	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 1230 hours over Naqurah.
	0610	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1840 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
9 June 2013	0600	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 1400 hours over Rumaysh.
	0930	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Sidon. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1110 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1305	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1445 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
10 June 2013	1010	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and the South before leaving at 1655 hours over Naqurah.
	1020	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and the South before leaving at 2120 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1235	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1630 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
11 June 2013	0740	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek, the South and Hirmil before leaving at 2110 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0750	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs and the South before leaving at 1840 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0810	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 1720 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0850	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Aytarun. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek, Hirmil, Akkar and Tripoli before leaving at 1425 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0955	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 1425 hours over Naqurah.
	1045	Four Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the occupied Shab'a Farms. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1145 hours over the occupied Shab'a Farms.
	1055	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1220 hours over the sea off Naqurah.
12 June 2013	0655	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1640 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0700	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South, Riyaq, Baalbek and the South before leaving at 1750 hours over Naqurah.
	0700	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 2125 hours over Naqurah.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	0725	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Juniyah, Beirut and its suburbs and Jubayl (Byblos), then over Beirut and its suburbs again before leaving at 1310 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1025	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1220 hours over the sea off Kafr Killa.
	1615	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1805 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
13 June 2013	0610	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South, Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1730 hours over Kafr Killa.
	0620	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1810 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0715	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 1835 hours over Naqurah.
	2000	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs and the South before leaving at 0610 hours on 14 June over Rumaysh.
	2030	Four Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 2150 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
14 June 2013	0830	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South, Beirut and its suburbs, Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 1830 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1050	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1230 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
15 June 2013	0720	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa and heading north. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek, and Hirmil before leaving at 1620 hours over Rumaysh.
16 June 2013	0835	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek, Hirmil and the South before leaving at 1410 hours over Naqurah.
	0950	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Aytarun. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1135 hours over Naqurah.
17 June 2013	0620	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South, Beirut and Dahiyah before leaving at 2350 hours over Naqurah.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
18 June 2013	0900	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South, Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 2215 hours over Naqurah.
	1135	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1315 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
19 June 2013	0650	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 1730 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1205	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1355 hours over the sea west of Naqurah.
	2115 2155	Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace. They circled over Lebanese territorial waters off Tyre as far as Ra's Naqurah, releasing heat balloons.
20 June 2013	0650	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 2020 hours over Naqurah.
	1010	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled between Iqlim al-Kharrub and the South before leaving at 1405 hours over Rumaysh.
	1045	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1700 hours over the sea west of Naqurah.
21 June 2013	0600	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs and the South before leaving at 1500 hours over Rumaysh.
	0915	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 1530 hours over Rumaysh.
	1105	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1300 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1900	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs and the South before leaving at 1815 hours on 22 June over Alma al-Sha'b.
22 June 2013	0645	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1920 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
23 June 2013	0815	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 0920 hours over Rumaysh.
	1020	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
		They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1215 hours over Kafr Killa.
24 June 2013	0905	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 1250 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0905	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut, Juniyah, Jubayl, Beirut and Matn before leaving at 1440 hours over Naqurah.
	0905	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 1745 hours over Rumaysh.
	1120	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1340 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1650	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 0255 hours on 25 June over Naqurah.
25 June 2013	0615	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1730 hours over Kafr Killa.
	0945	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 2015 hours over Rumaysh.
	1045	Four Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1130 hours over Naqurah.
	1130	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South and Beirut and its suburbs before leaving at 0030 hours on 26 June over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1650	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1840 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
26 June 2013	0710	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1410 hours over Rumaysh.
	1000	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1955 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1035	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1210 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1130	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 2040 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1405	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1600 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
27 June 2013	0900	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1330 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0905	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1055 hours over the sea off Naqurah.
	0915	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek, Hirmil and Akkar before leaving at 1340 hours over Kafr Killa.
	0935	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 1215 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1110	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1400 hours over the sea off Tripoli in the direction of Turkey.
	1120	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 2020 hours over Rumaysh.
	1330	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1620 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1625	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1720 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1715	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1920 hours over Rumaysh.
	1920	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Shikka. It circled over Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 0740 hours on 28 June over Alma al-Sha'b.
	2130	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Shikka. It circled over the sea off Shikka before leaving at 0700 hours on 28 June over the sea west of Naqurah.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
28 June 2013	0630	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea off Shikka. It circled over Baalbek and Naqurah before leaving at 1345 hours over Naqurah.
	0700	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1820 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0820	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1010 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1025	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea off Shikka. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1130 hours over the sea off Naqurah.
	1210	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea off Shikka. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1335 hours on over the sea off Naqurah.
	1215	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 1905 hours over Rumaysh.
	1810	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 0710 hours on 29 June over Rumaysh.
	1830	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1955 hours over Naqurah.
29 June 2013	0510	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over the South before leaving at 1800 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0615	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 1400 hours over Rumaysh.
	1120	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 2215 hours over Rumaysh.
	1900	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1320 hours on 30 June over Kafr Killa.
30 June 2013	1115	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 2130 hours over Naqurah.
	1235	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1455 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1450	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea off Naqurah. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1715 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1930	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Rumaysh. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 0500 hours on 1 July over Naqurah.

Annex to the letter dated 21 August 2013 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Violation of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Armenia* for June 2013

No.	*Date*	*Time*	*Direction (locality)*	*Used weapons*	*Casualties and damages*
1.	1 June	00.15-00.20	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
2.		00.15-00.30	Yusifjanly and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
3.		01.15-01.25	Yusifjanly and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
4.		01.40-01.50	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AKM and AK-type assault rifles	–
5.		02.00-02.10	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
6.		05.25-05.40	Gorgan and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	DShK heavy machine gun	–
7.		05.30-05.40	Gorgan and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
8.		05.35-05.45	Gorgan and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AKM and AK-type assault rifles	–
9.		15.50-15.55	Gorgan and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
10.		23.20-23.25	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
11.	2 June	00.15-00.25	Shykhlar and Bash Garvand villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AKM and AK-type assault rifles	–
12.		00.50-01.00	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AKM and AK-type assault rifles	–
13.		02.25-02.30	Shykhlar and Bash Garvand villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
14.		04.10-04.30	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
15.		13.00-13.15	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
16.		19.15-19.35	Parakavar village (Ijevan district, Armenia) and Gyzylhajyly village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–

* Settlements of the Republic of Azerbaijan included in this information are under occupation by the Republic of Armenia or situated close to the fire point areas.

Abbreviations: AK/AKM, Kalashnikov rifle; PK, Kalashnikov machine gun; SVD, 7.9 mm sniper weapon; DShK, 12.7 mm machine gun.

No.	Date	Time	Direction (locality)	Used weapons	Casualties and damages
17.		19.30-19.45	Gulustan village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AKM and AK-type assault rifles	–
18.		20.55-21.05	Chinari village (Berd district, Armenia) and Garalar village (Tovuz district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
19.		23.10-23.15	Yusifjanly and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
20.		23.00-23.30	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
21.	3 June	00.40-01.00	Gorgan and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
22.		01.25-01.30	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
23.		03.55-04.10	Talysh village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan) and Chayly village (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
24.		04.10-04.20	Garagashly and Chemenli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
25.		04.35-04.45	Gorgan and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
26.		04.50-05.00	Gorgan and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
27.		15.40-15.55	Talysh village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan) and Chayly village (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
28.		18.05-18.15	Talysh village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan) and Chayly village (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
29.	4 June	15.00-15.10	Jerabert and Karmiravan villages (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
30.	5 June	01.10-01.12	Kengerli village (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
31.		01.30-01.45	Gorgan and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AKM and AK-type assault rifles	–
32.		01.35-01.40	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AKM and AK-type assault rifles	–
33.		01.40-01.55	Parakavar village (Ijevan district, Armenia) and Gyzylhajyly village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	AKM and AK-type assault rifles	–
34.		01.40-01.50	Gorgan and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AKM and AK-type assault rifles	–
35.		01.45-01.50	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AKM and AK-type assault rifles	–
36.		02.10-02.25	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–

No.	*Date*	*Time*	*Direction (locality)*	*Used weapons*	*Casualties and damages*
37.		02.20-02.25	Shykhlar and Bash Garvand villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AKM and AK-type assault rifles	–
38.		05.35-05.45	Gorgan and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AKM and AK-type assault rifles	–
39.		10.40-10.55	Jerabert and Karmiravan villages (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
40.		14.55-15.15	Orjenekidze village (Krasnoselsk district, Armenia) and Galakend village (Gedabey district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
41.		22.00-22.20	Chinari village (Berd district, Armenia) and Garalar village (Tovuz district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
42.		23.05-23.15	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AKM and AK-type assault rifles	–
43.	6 June	01.50-01.55	Kengerli village (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
44.		04.40-04.50	Shykhlar and Bash Garvand villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
45.		18.10-18.30	Gulustan village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
46.		22.20-22.30	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
47.		23.40-23.50	Jerabert and Karmiravan villages (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AKM and AK-type assault rifles	–
48.	7 June	01.20-01.45	Mehdili and Jojug Marjanly villages (Jabrayil district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
49.		01.20-01.45	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
50.		01.20-01.45	Gorgan and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
51.		01.20-01.45	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
52.		03.05-03.20	Talysh village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan) and Chayly village (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
53.		04.45-05.10	Javahirli and Garadaghly villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
54.		13.00-13.20	Gulustan village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
55.		15.35-15.40	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
56.		16.30-16.32	Merzili and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
57.		21.20-21.23	Ashaghy Veyselli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	SVD sniper rifle	–

No.	Date	Time	Direction (locality)	Used weapons	Casualties and damages
58.	8 June	01.15-01.18	Mehdili and Jojug Marjanly villages (Jabrayil district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
59.		05.20-05.25	Shykhlar and Bash Garvand villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
60.		05.20-05.25	Javahirli and Garadaghly villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
61.		05.30-05.40	Gorgan and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
62.		09.45-10.00	Kurdeliler village (Goygol district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
63.		15.25-15.35	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
64.		16.50-17.00	Merzili and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
65.		22.20-22.30	Merzili and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
66.		23.10-23.20	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
67.		23.20-23.30	Shirvanly and Chemenli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
68.		23.50-00.00	Berkaber village (Ijevan district, Armenia) and Gyzylhajyly village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
69.	9 June	01.05-01.35	Vazashen village (Ijevan district, Armenia) and Gyzylhajyly village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
70.		01.30-01.35	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
71.		01.35-01.40	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
72.		02.20-02.25	Shykhlar and Bash Garvand villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
73.		02.50-03.04	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
74.		05.04-05.45	Kengerli village (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
75.		14.10-14.40	Orjenekidze village (Krasnoselsk district, Armenia) and Galakend village (Gedabey district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
76.		14.20-14.30	Barekamavan village (Noyemberyan district, Armenia) and Gaymagly village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
77.		17.30-17.35	Merzili and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–

No.	*Date*	*Time*	*Direction (locality)*	*Used weapons*	*Casualties and damages*
78.		18.20-18.40	Talysh village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan) and Chayly village (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
79.		21.20-21.28	Merzili and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
80.		21.30-21.35	Merzili and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
81.		21.32-21.38	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
82.	10 June	00.15-00.20	Javahirli and Garadaghly villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
83.		00.40-00.50	Saryjaly and Garadaghly villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
84.		01.10-01.20	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
85.		04.00-04.05	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
86.		04.00-04.10	Gorgan and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
87.		04.10-04.20	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
88.		04.30-04.50	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
89.		08.00-08.10	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
90.		15.30-15.50	Gulustan village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
91.		16.50-16.55	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
92.		19.05-19.20	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AKM and AK-type assault rifles	–
93.		19.05-19.20	Talysh village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan) and Chayly village (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle and DShK heavy machine gun	–
94.		21.25-21.40	Jerabert and Karmiravan villages (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
95.		21.50-22.05	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
96.		22.00-22.30	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	DShK heavy machine gun	–
97.		22.40-22.50	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
98.	11 June	05.10-05.15	Shykhlar and Bash Garvand villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–

No.	Date	Time	Direction (locality)	Used weapons	Casualties and damages
99.		05.30-05.40	Gorgan and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AKM and AK-type assault rifles	–
100.		13.40-13.50	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	DShK heavy machine gun	–
101.		16.00-16.10	Kengerli village (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
102.		17.15-17.20	Merzili and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AKM and AK-type assault rifles	–
103.		19.05-19.10	Merzili and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
104.		19.45-19.55	Jerabert and Karmiravan villages (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
105.		20.00-20.10	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
106.		20.45-21.00	Jerabert and Karmiravan villages (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AKM and AK-type assault rifles	–
107.		22.30-22.50	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
108.		22.35-23.40	Namirli village (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
109.	12 June	01.20-01.45	Merzili and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
110.		02.45-02.55	Saryjaly and Garadaghly villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
111.		05.30-05.40	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
112.		12.45-12.55	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	SVD sniper rifle	–
113.		15.50-16.20	Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AKM and AK-type assault rifles	–
114.		19.20-19.35	Jerabert and Karmiravan villages (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
115.		23.15-23.25	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
116.		23.50-23.55	Yusifjanly and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
117.	13 June	00.45-00.50	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
118.		01.35-01.45	Ashaghy Seyidahmedli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
119.		06.00-06.10	Merzili and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
120.		15.20-15.28	Merzili and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	SVD sniper rifle	–

No.	*Date*	*Time*	*Direction (locality)*	*Used weapons*	*Casualties and damages*
121.		15.30-15.50	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
122.		15.40-15.45	Merzili and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
123.		15.40-16.00	Gulustan village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
124.		17.30-17.45	Garagashly and Chemenli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
125.		17.30-18.00	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
126.		22.45-22.50	Merzili and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	SVD sniper rifle	–
127.	14 June	01.10-01.15	Novruzlu village (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
128.		01.35-01.45	Voskevan village (Noyemberyan district, Armenia) and Gushchu Ayrum village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
129.		02.05-02.20	Gorgan and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
130.		02.30-02.35	Shykhlar and Bash Garvand villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
131.		15.10-15.25	Orjenekidze village (Krasnoselsk district, Armenia) and Galakend village (Gedabey district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
132.		23.30-23.50	Garagashly and Chemenli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
133.	15 June	00.10-00.30	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
134.		05.00-05.05	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
135.		05.05-05.10	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
136.		10.00-10.15	Gulustan village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	DShK heavy machine gun	–
137.		12.10-12.35	Orjenekidze village (Krasnoselsk district, Armenia)	DShK heavy machine gun	–
138.		18.00-18.25	Gulustan village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	DShK heavy machine gun and AKM assault rifle	–
139.	16 June	01.05-01.25	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
140.		04.35-04.40	Shykhlar and Bash Garvand villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
141.		05.30-05.35	Gorgan and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–

No.	Date	Time	Direction (locality)	Used weapons	Casualties and damages
142.		05.50-05.55	Gorgan and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
143.		05.55-06.00	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
144.		12.00-12.15	Gulustan village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	DShK heavy machine gun and AKM assault rifle	–
145.		12.20-12.30	Gulustan village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	DShK heavy machine gun and AKM assault rifle	–
146.		23.45-00.00	Karagullar village (Dashkesen district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
147.	17 June	00.30-00.35	Seyidahmedli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
148.		00.40-00.45	Seyidahmedli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
149.		02.00-02.40	Gulustan village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
150.		04.20-04.55	Berdavan village (Noyemberyan district, Armenia) and Kemerli village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
151.		04.45-04.50	Ashaghy Seyidahmedli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
152.		05.15-05.20	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
153.		05.15-05.20	Gorgan and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
154.		05.20-05.25	Seyidahmedli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
155.		05.40-05.45	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
156.		13.05-13.20	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
157.		15.30-15.50	Shirvanly and Chemenli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
158.		22.30-23.00	Gulustan village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
159.	18 June	00.05-00.15	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
160.		00.10-00.25	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
161.		01.30-01.50	Ashaghy Veyselli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
162.		09.05-09.10	Yusifjanly and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–

No.	Date	Time	Direction (locality)	Used weapons	Casualties and damages
163.		14.10-14.30	Gulustan village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	DShK heavy machine gun and AKM assault rifle	–
164.	19 June	00.20-00.30	Shuraabad and Tezekend villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
165.		01.30-01.45	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
166.		02.00-02.20	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AKM and AK-type assault rifles	–
167.		02.05-02.23	Namirli village (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
168.		02.05-02.23	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
169.		05.55-06.00	Berkaber village (Ijevan district, Armenia) and Gyzylhajyly village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
170.		16.30-16.40	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
171.		20.30-21.00	Kurdeliler village (Goygol district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
172.		21.05-21.20	Gulustan village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
173.		22.30-22.45	Gorgan and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
174.		22.55-23.10	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AKM and AK-type assault rifles	–
175.	20 June	01.00-01.15	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
176.		16.10-16.35	Orjenekidze village (Krasnoselsk district, Armenia) and Galakend village (Gedabey district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle and DShK heavy machine gun	–
177.		17.40-18.00	Talysh village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan) and Chayly village (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
178.	21 June	00.30-00.35	Voskepar village (Noyemberyan district, Armenia)	AK-type assault rifle	–
179.		17.05-17.25	Gulustan village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
180.		20.20-20.40	Tapgaragoyunlu village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
181.	22 June	01.10-01.30	Tapgaragoyunlu village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
182.		11.00-11.10	Karagullar village (Dashkesen district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
183.		16.00-16.05	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–

No.	Date	Time	Direction (locality)	Used weapons	Casualties and damages
184.	23 June	00.25-00.35	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
185.		01.25-01.35	Talysh village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan) and Chayly village (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
186.		02.40-02.50	Gorgan and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
187.		03.40-03.50	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
188.		08.10-08.45	Gulustan village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
189.		14.40-14.50	Jerabert and Karmiravan villages (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
190.		15.20-15.30	Saryjaly and Garadaghly villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
191.		15.40-15.50	Saryjaly and Garadaghly villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
192.		21.20-21.25	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
193.	24 June	01.20-01.30	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
194.		01.40-01.50	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
195.		03.20-03.30	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
196.		13.35-13.55	Orjenekidze village (Krasnoselsk district, Armenia) and Galakend village (Gedabey district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
197.		16.30-16.35	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
198.		21.15-21.30	Gulustan village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle and DShK heavy machine gun	–
199.		23.35-23.45	Yusifjanly and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
200.	25 June	00.40-00.50	Shykhlar and Bash Garvand villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
201.		01.30-01.40	Gorgan and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
202.		02.10-02.50	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
203.		02.10-02.50	Talysh village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan) and Chayly village (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–

No.	*Date*	*Time*	*Direction (locality)*	*Used weapons*	*Casualties and damages*
204.		06.15-06.30	Paravarkar village (Ijevan district, Armenia) and Gyzylhajyly village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
205.		07.10-07.15	Ashaghy Veyselli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
206.		07.10-07.15	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
207.		07.20-07.25	Ashaghy Veyselli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	SVD sniper rifle	–
208.		23.10-23.20	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
209.		23.40-23.50	Ashaghy Veyselli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
210.	26 June	00.20-00.30	Gorgan and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
211.		01.05-01.25	Paravarkar village (Ijevan district, Armenia) and Gyzylhajyly village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	SVD sniper rifle	–
212.		16.05-16.20	Gulustan village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AKM and AK-type assault rifles and DShK heavy machine gun	–
213.		22.45-23.05	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AKM and AK-type assault rifles	–
214.	27 June	00.10-00.15	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
215.		00.25-00.30	Ashaghy Seyidahmedli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
216.		00.37-00.45	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
217.		01.05-01.10	Ashaghy Seyidahmedli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
218.		01.08-01.14	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
219.		01.12-01.20	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
220.		02.13-02.20	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
221.		02.15-02.25	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
222.		02.20-02.25	Gorgan and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
223.		02.23-02.33	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–

No.	Date	Time	Direction (locality)	Used weapons	Casualties and damages
224.		02.25-02.40	Jerabert and Karmiravan villages (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
225.		02.35-03.15	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
226.		02.48-02.55	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
227.		02.47-02.58	Gorgan and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
228.		02.50-02.55	Ashaghy Veyselli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
229.		03.05-03.10	Ashaghy Veyselli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
230.		05.30-05.35	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
231.		09.55-10.00	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
232.		10.10-10.15	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
233.		12.10-12.35	Gulustan village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
234.		13.10-13.20	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
235.		18.00-18.10	Gulustan village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle and DShK heavy machine gun	–
236.		23.45-00.05	Gorgan and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
237.	28 June	00.05-00.15	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
238.		00.15-00.23	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
239.		00.35-00.40	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
240.		00.50-00.55	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
241.		02.10-02.30	Paravarkar village (Ijevan district, Armenia) and Gyzylhajyly village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
242.		02.30-02.40	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
243.		02.30-02.45	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
244.		03.45-03.47	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	SVD sniper rifle	–

No.	Date	Time	Direction (locality)	Used weapons	Casualties and damages
245.		03.50-03.53	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	SVD sniper rifle	–
246.		03.56-04.00	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
247.		10.40-10.44	Merzili and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
248.		10.45-10.50	Merzili and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
249.		17.30-18.00	Gulustan village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
250.		18.30-18.50	Kurdeliler village (Goygol district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
251.		18.55-19.05	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
252.		19.00-19.15	Kurdeliler village (Goygol district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
253.		20.50-20.55	Ashaghy Veyselli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
254.		22.40-22.45	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
255.	29 June	02.35-02.45	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
256.		02.40-02.45	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	SVD sniper rifle	–
257.		02.50-02.55	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
258.		03.05-03.10	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
259.		03.10-03.15	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
260.		05.40-05.55	Garagashly and Chemenli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
261.		05.50-06.10	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
262.		12.30-12.40	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
263.		13.30-13.55	Orjenekidze village (Krasnoselsk district, Armenia) and Galakend village (Gedabey district, Azerbaijan)	DShK heavy machine gun	–
264.		21.45-22.00	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
265.		21.45-21.55	Berkaber village (Ijevan district, Armenia) and Gyzylhajyly village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–

No.	*Date*	*Time*	*Direction (locality)*	*Used weapons*	*Casualties and damages*
266.	30 June	00.15-00.20	Ashaghy Veyselli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
267.		00.25-00.30	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	–
268.		01.20-01.25	Gorgan and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
269.		01.22-01.28	Ashaghy Veyselli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
270.		02.10-02.20	Novruzlu village (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
271.		03.30-03.35	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
272.		04.15-04.40	Ashaghy Seyidahmedli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–
273.		05.05-05.10	Berkaber village (Ijevan district, Armenia) and Gyzylhajyly village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	–

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Securing States and societies: strengthening the United Nations comprehensive support to security sector reform

Report of the Secretary-General

Summary

The present report reviews the United Nations support to security sector reform, and includes recommendations on how best to strengthen the Organization's comprehensive approach in this area, pursuant to the statement by the President of the Security Council of 12 October 2011 (S/PRST/2011/19). A number of achievements are highlighted and areas where further work is needed are noted, five years after the first report of the Secretary-General on security sector reform, entitled "Securing peace and development: the role of the United Nations in supporting security sector reform" (A/62/659-S/2008/39).

In the report of 2008, it was observed that, despite the Organization's extensive experience in assisting national actors to enhance or re-establish security, United Nations support for security sector reform had largely been pursued as an ad hoc undertaking, hampered by weak capacity and insufficient resources to deliver effective support to national authorities. Since then, the Organization has made important progress in addressing the priorities outlined in that report, in line with the guidance offered by Member States. This includes the elaboration of technical guidance and policies to enhance delivery of support, and the establishment of specialized capacities for security sector reform in the field and at United Nations Headquarters. In addition, system-wide coherence and coordination have been improved, including through the concerted efforts of the inter-agency Security Sector Reform Task Force, and partnerships have been forged with regional and subregional organizations, Member States forums, and civil society.

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While much has been achieved, more needs to be done. Experience has shown that the viability of security sector reform efforts depends on the political environment in which reform is carried out. Support to security sector reform therefore needs to be better linked to broader political reforms that create the foundations for transformative processes such as national dialogues, reconciliation efforts or transitional justice initiatives. In the absence of these foundations, security sector reform is neither sustainable nor transformative.

The question of political space, leadership and commitment is both a precondition for and manifestation of national ownership. A key challenge for operationalizing national ownership is ensuring that security sector reform processes reflect the host Government's primary role, including with regard to the allocation of national resources to the reform process, while promoting inclusiveness. From the perspective of the United Nations, it may mean taking additional steps to ensure that Security Council mandates more visibly incorporate the perspectives of the countries under consideration.

Successful security sector reform transcends activities targeting individual components of the sector such as the police, army, border control, coast guard and civil emergencies services, among others, which seek to enhance the effectiveness and professionalism of security providers. Critically, the Organization and Member States have come to appreciate the importance of sector-wide initiatives that address the strategic, governance and architectural framework of the sector. In order to create basic trust between citizens and State security institutions, there must be improvements in the provision, quality and governance of security services. This requires a clear focus on the ultimate objective of increasing people's security, which, in turn, necessitates an inclusive dialogue and the participation of communities and civil society. Accordingly, United Nations support to national security sector reform efforts should continue to contribute to improved security through initiatives that support longer-term reform, conflict prevention and transformation while at the same time assisting in facilitating immediate security service delivery.

To meet these multiple requirements and to effectively respond to the increasing number and complexity of Security Council mandates and Member State requests for security sector reform support, the Organization's capacity to further deliver assistance and to monitor and evaluate impact must be enhanced. Activities and expertise must be better linked to a broader set of practice areas, such as disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, control of small arms and light weapons, reduction of armed violence, public financial management in the security sector, anti-corruption measures, gendered security analysis, and increased respect for and protection of human rights for individuals and groups at risk. Partnerships must be deepened and expanded given the increase in the number and type of actors providing support to security sector reform, including many Member States that previously benefited from such support.

Building on these lessons, the report contains a number of recommendations on how the United Nations, Member States and partners can further support security sector reform through encouraging inclusive and sustainable national ownership; promoting security service delivery; building capacities for reform that better link component-specific and sector-wide initiatives; expanding and deepening partnerships; encouraging dialogue and knowledge-sharing; and further enhancing inter-agency coherence and coordination.

I. Introduction

1. The present report on security sector reform[1] is submitted pursuant to the statement made by the President of the Security Council at its 6630th meeting, on 12 October 2011, in which the Council requested the Secretary-General to submit an assessment of the United Nations support for security sector reform, including those efforts in Africa, and make recommendations on how best to strengthen the United Nations comprehensive approach to security sector reform, taking into account the linkages between United Nations assistance and conflict prevention and peacebuilding, and also taking into consideration the views of relevant United Nations organs and actors (S/PRST/2011/19).

2. In 2007, the Security Council acknowledged the need for a comprehensive report on the United Nations approaches to security sector reform (see S/PRST/2007/3). Accordingly, the report of January 2008, entitled "Securing peace and development: the role of the United Nations in supporting security sector reform", underlined the importance of security sector reform for security, development and human rights as preconditions for sustainable peace, and highlighted the primary responsibility of States in the provision of security. It defined security sector reform as a "process of assessment, review and implementation as well as monitoring and evaluation led by national authorities that has as its goal the enhancement of effective and accountable security for the State and its peoples without discrimination and with full respect for human rights and the rule of law" (A/62/659-S/2008/39, para. 17).

3. In that report, I observed that, while the United Nations had been engaged in security sector reform for decades, its support had remained largely an ad hoc undertaking and found that a holistic and coherent United Nations approach to security sector reform is vital. I concluded that the Organization lacked common principles and standards, a system-wide approach, requisite resources and, in some cases, capacities to deliver effective support to national authorities. A number of recommendations were put forward to address those gaps.

4. Since 2008, the United Nations has made important progress in implementing those recommendations in line with the guidance offered by Member States. Security sector reform capacities in the field and at United Nations Headquarters have been established in order to better respond to requests from Member States and mandates of the Security Council. There have also been improvements in strengthening inter-agency coherence and coordination in the area of security sector reform, including through the inter-agency Security Sector Reform Task Force.[2]

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[1] Security sector reform is sometimes expressed as security sector governance, security sector transformation, security sector development or security sector management, as well as security and justice reform, depending on the context.

[2] The inter-agency Security Sector Reform Task Force is co-chaired by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Other members include the Department of Political Affairs; the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR); the Office of the Special Adviser on Africa; the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict; the Peacebuilding Support Office; the United Nations Children's Fund; the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women); the United Nations Institute for Training and Research; the Office for Disarmament Affairs; the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC); the United Nations Office for Project Services; and the United Nations Population Fund. For more information on the Task Force, see http://unssr.unlb.org/.

5. Security sector reform guidance and policies have been developed, thus improving coordination and coherence. In addition, a United Nations roster of security sector reform experts has been created to provide timely and flexible expertise to meet demands, and regular forums have been established for practitioners of security sector reform to exchange experiences and lessons learned. Security sector reform sensitization and training products have been delivered to United Nations practitioners, Member States and other partners. Various clusters of Member States have facilitated policy dialogues, and partnerships have been built with regional organizations and civil society networks. As acknowledged by Member States, the net result is a marked improvement in the coherence of the United Nations approach to security sector reform, and in the quality of support to national efforts.[3]

6. While significant steps have been taken towards the implementation of the recommendations contained in the previous report, the global security and development landscape is continuously changing and the Organization has learned lessons that have implications for its support to security sector reform processes.[4] This report presents an assessment of the Organization's impact in this area five years after the first report, and makes recommendations on how to further strengthen its comprehensive approach to security sector reform to meet future challenges.

7. Section II provides an overview of the emerging global trends within which the United Nations currently operates and their implications for the Organization's security sector reform agenda. Section III takes stock of United Nations support for and engagement with security sector reform since the first report. Section IV identifies remaining challenges, while section V focuses on the lessons learned in the past five years and puts forward a number of recommendations for the United Nations, Member States and other partners. Section VI provides conclusions.

II. Global developments and trends in support to security sector reform

8. The objective of security sector reform is to help ensure that people are safer through the enhanced effectiveness and accountability of security institutions operating under civilian control within a framework of the rule of law and human rights. Provision of security is a core function of the State. In many contexts, security institutions, such as the military and the police, are the most visible representatives of the State for the general public. Thus effective, accountable and professional security institutions can have a defining and positive impact on people's confidence in the State. In some contexts, however, security institutions are incapable of protecting populations against threats. In others, security providers not only fail to protect individuals and communities, they may marginalize, exclude or even prey on the very populations they are entrusted to protect.

[3] See S/PRST/2011/19 and the outcome documents of the events held by the United Nations Group of Friends of Security Sector Reform on 10 and 11 December 2012 (available from http://unssr.unlb.org/).

[4] See the report of the Secretary-General on the quadrennial comprehensive policy review of operational activities for development of the United Nations system (A/67/93-E/2012/79).

9. Such security patterns, combined with the emergence of new security dynamics across the globe, have challenged the validity of conventional approaches to security and reinforced the relevance of security sector reform. Recent events in Egypt, Libya, Mali and Tunisia, and diverse contexts such as Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia, re-emphasize the relevance of security sector reform as a necessary tool for political transition and governance, which extends beyond the conventional focus on security sector reform in post-conflict situations. These and other contexts demonstrate that the security of the State and the state of security (of individuals and communities) are mutually interdependent; in other words, we have learned that when populations are not secure, neither is the State. This poses an important challenge to the typical State-centric, post-conflict approach to security sector reform and calls for approaches that combine the central role of the State with its ultimate dependence on, and linkages to, the security and safety of individuals and communities. Current approaches to security sector reform have been confronted with a proliferation of transnational threats, including trafficking in humans, drugs and arms; terrorism; insurgency; climate change and environmental degradation; organized crime and armed violence; and cybercrime. This has led to the realization that no single State can, on its own, meet these transborder challenges, and points to the need for increased cooperation across borders.

10. The security sector reform landscape has experienced significant developments and changes also in the number and nature of actors supporting reform processes. Non-traditional actors and a diverse range of countries are featuring more prominently in the provision of resources and expertise. There has been an increase in exchanges of knowledge and experience on security sector assistance between Member States, many of which have been beneficiaries of support in the area of security sector reform (see S/PRST/2011/19). Furthermore, regional and subregional actors such as the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have become increasingly indispensable in the conceptualization, implementation, monitoring, evaluation and provision of external support to security sector reform processes, including through the articulation of policy frameworks.

11. The prevalence of traditional, informal security governance practices, particularly in Africa, demonstrates their continuing relevance in people's lives and the ambivalent relationship they continue to have with modern statutory institutions. In many contexts, non-State actors play an important role in delivering security and justice services. In other contexts, however, those actors can undermine security, contribute to human rights violations, and challenge the role and responsibility of the State. In all contexts, the United Nations is confronted by the need to ensure that it supports frameworks and interventions in the area of security sector reform that are inclusive and accountable, comply with human rights standards, and aim to enhance the social contract between the State and society and, ultimately, between the people and the security institutions empowered to protect them. The United Nations recognizes the relevance of those actors but does not, as yet, see how best to engage them. There is a need to better understand and address their role in the provision of security and in security sector reform more broadly. The emerging trend towards the outsourcing to private companies of support to security sector reform introduces a new set of dynamics and challenges, including an increased need to ensure national ownership and democratic control and oversight.

12. Changing patterns of violence also call for innovative responses. Conventional wars between and within countries have steadily decreased but many countries now experience serious and often repeating cycles of criminal and political violence. Indeed, most of the violence occurs in countries that are not experiencing active armed conflict. In 2011 the World Bank, in its *World Development Report*, found that no low-income fragile or conflict-affected State had so far achieved a single Millennium Development Goal and noted that countries that managed to reduce violence experienced faster development gains. It concluded that in fragile settings priority should be given to restoring confidence and to transforming State institutions so that they deliver justice, security and employment.[5]

13. One of the core objectives of peacebuilding is to address patterns of violence and insecurity by building resilient and legitimate institutions.[6] This requires addressing those deficits in the security sector that may have led to or exacerbated instability in the first place. Security sector reform is therefore often a key component of a country's peacebuilding agenda. An effective, accountable and legitimate security sector, respectful of the rule of law and international human rights norms and standards, can respond appropriately to sources of conflict and instability and prevent their escalation. In societies devastated by conflict or emerging from repressive rule, security sector reform has become a key component of comprehensive transitional justice programmes. At the same time, ensuring effective governance and oversight of the security sector to mitigate its politicization or instrumentalization can be vital to conflict prevention.

14. The New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States[7] stressed the importance of addressing the underlying causes of conflict and outlined a framework known as the Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals to streamline support. Those goals target security, justice, legitimate politics, economic foundations, and revenue and services. While in the Millennium Declaration of 2000 States recognized the importance of peacebuilding and citizen security, those concerns were not adequately reflected in the Millennium Development Goals. The specific goals and targets therefore did not incorporate key security, human rights and rule of law factors that form the basis for development. This has prompted calls for an increased focus on security in defining the post-Millennium Development Goal agenda, and the Global Thematic Consultation on Conflict, Violence and Disaster has played an important role in bringing attention to bear on this area in the current dialogue on the post-2015 development agenda.

15. These realities have highlighted the need to better balance service delivery to ensure that people's security and safety are restored or maintained, with a focus on longer-term institution- and capacity-building. Responding to immediate security needs is critical to restoring confidence and often serves as an important entry point for broader institutional transformation. The imperative of initiating long-term institutional reforms should not detract from the need to ensure that the basic and

[5] See World Bank, *World Development Report 2011* (Washington, D.C., 2011). Available from http://www.worldbank.org.

[6] In 2009, the report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict identified support to basic safety and security, including strengthening the rule of law and initiation of security sector reform, as one of the five priority interventions in peacebuilding contexts (A/63/881-S/2009/304, para. 17).

[7] The New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States was adopted in 2011 by the Group of Seven Plus (g7+), a group of 18 fragile and conflict-affected countries and their international partners.

immediate security needs of the population are met. This requires an inclusive and transparent approach to security sector reform based on dialogue between authorities and communities around security challenges and longer-term institution-building. Such dialogue should take into account the fact that security is often defined differently by women, men, boys and girls, as well as members of minority groups. Effective monitoring of the security sector by democratic oversight mechanisms is also important to prevent human rights violations and to build trust in security institutions.

16. Within this changing security environment, the United Nations is being asked to play a more central role in supporting national security sector reform efforts in a multiplicity of national and regional contexts.[8] Security sector reform has firmly entered into the Organization's peacekeeping, human rights,[9] peacebuilding, conflict prevention, and development agendas. This has been demonstrated, for example, by the increase in the number of Security Council mandates calling for security sector reform. In 2008, there was a total of 14 references to security sector reform in Security Council resolutions; in 2012, this number had risen to 37.

17. The complexity of Security Council mandates and Member State requests has also increased. Today, the United Nations is being asked to support the development of security "architectures", moving beyond isolated support to security "pillars". Increasingly, requests for support to security sector reform processes extend beyond efforts to right-size armed forces or train and equip uniformed personnel, which are critical yet narrowly defined exercises. The United Nations is required to balance its support for the reform of individual components of the security sector with sector-wide interventions that address strategic governance, management and oversight aspects.[10] Effective security service delivery clearly depends on the level of operational competence of individual security sector components such as defence, law enforcement, corrections, border and immigration and intelligence services. However, sector-wide interventions, which include the development of national security policies, strategies, plans and legislation, the facilitation of national dialogues on security, the development of management and oversight capacities, and

[8] The Security Council also made this observation in its presidential statement (S/PRST/2011/19), noting that an increasing number of peacekeeping and special political missions are mandated to support national security sector reform programmes, including those in Africa. This has also been recognized by the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, which has taken note since 2010 of the increasing demands placed on the Security Sector Reform Unit in respect of supporting United Nations missions in the field (see A/64/19, A/65/19 and A/66/19).

[9] The importance of security sector reform has been recognized by the Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence, who emphasized the importance of adopting a comprehensive approach to transitional justice by incorporating, inter alia, institutional reform and vetting of public employees and officials as measures to ensure the non-recurrence of serious human rights violations (see, for example, A/HRC/21/46).

[10] In its reports for 2011 and 2012, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations stressed the importance of ensuring effective integration as regards sector-wide and component levels of United Nations support both in the field and at Headquarters (see A/65/19, para. 124, and A/66/19, para. 136). The Special Committee further recognized the important role that the United Nations can play in the provision of assistance in a variety of areas, including national security sector strategies; security sector legislation; security sector reviews; national security sector development plans; national dialogue on security sector reform; and national management and oversight capacities, as well as to national coordination bodies for security sector reform (see A/65/19, para. 126, and A/66/19, para. 138).

the conduct of security sector reviews, seek to improve the governance of the security sector as a whole.

III. Taking stock of United Nations support for security sector reform

Overview of the core elements of the report of 2008

18. My report of 2008 identified 10 basic principles that should guide the United Nations engagement in security sector reform (A/62/659-S/2008/39, para. 45).[11] On the basis of those principles, I recognized that the United Nations would rarely be an exclusive actor in a security sector reform process, noting that bilateral and multilateral partners would continue to play a major role in supporting national authorities in many contexts. I therefore identified potential roles for the Organization, drawing a distinction between "normative" and "operational" roles.

19. The potential normative roles identified in the report included the establishment of common international principles and standards as well as policies and guidelines, in addition to the contribution to collective knowledge on security sector reform (ibid., paras. 47-49). With regard to operational roles, it was noted that, where requested or mandated, the Organization can help to establish an enabling environment by supporting needs assessments and strategic planning, as well as coordination and specialized resource mobilization, providing technical advice to and building the capacity of security institutions and their oversight mechanisms, and supporting national and international partners in monitoring and reviewing progress (ibid., para. 50).

20. Building a coherent United Nations approach to security sector reform and forging partnerships (ibid., paras. 51-66) were also identified as priorities. The actual implementation of those roles, by Member States, and by United Nations entities individually or collectively, in the framework of the Security Sector Reform Task Force, has evolved significantly.

Normative role: building the foundations for effective delivery of security sector reform assistance

21. The legitimacy and global character of the United Nations give it a particular responsibility and opportunity to facilitate the elaboration of policy and guidance on security sector reform based on international laws and standards. Over the past five years, progress has been achieved in developing focused policy and guidance in key areas where this was lacking.

22. In response to requests from Member States, and following an extensive inter-agency consultation process, the Security Sector Reform Task Force prepared the first volume of the Integrated Technical Guidance Notes, which was launched

[11] Those principles included the centrality of national ownership; the need for flexible and tailored support and gender responsive approaches; the need for early planning for security sector reform and a clearly defined strategy; the centrality of integrity of motive, accountability and resources for the effectiveness of international support and effective coordination; and the importance of monitoring and evaluation against specific benchmarks.

late in 2012.[12] The notes provide United Nations staff with a common body of guidance for supporting national security sector reform processes in those areas where the Organization has a comparative advantage. The first guidance notes cover issues of immediate and practical relevance to United Nations staff, including national ownership of security sector reform; gender-responsive security sector reform; peace processes and security sector reform; democratic governance of the security sector; and support to national security policy and strategy-making. In 2012, during a high-level meeting of the United Nations Group of Friends of Security Sector Reform,[13] an informal Member State grouping, the guidance notes were identified as a significant achievement, which represents the implementation of a key component of the first report of the Secretary-General.[14] The development of the notes was considered to be a good example of how United Nations inter-agency coordination can lead to tangible outcomes.

23. A significant step forward was the adoption, in July 2011, of the human rights due diligence policy on United Nations support to non-United Nations security forces (see A/67/775-S/2013/110). The policy sets out principles for mainstreaming human rights in the work of United Nations actors supporting non-United Nations security entities. The main aim of the policy is to ensure that support is consistent with international human rights and humanitarian and refugee law and is not provided to security forces that risk committing grave violations of such law, or where the relevant authorities fail to take the necessary corrective or mitigating measures.

24. The first United Nations policy on defence sector reform was approved in August 2011 by the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, following consultations with Member States, United Nations entities and civil society. The policy, which applies to all staff of the United Nations, describes the elements and parameters of the Organization's support to nationally led reform processes, including by identifying principles, core tasks, and limitations and constraints.

25. To facilitate knowledge-sharing and policy development, the Security Sector Reform Task Force has developed a dedicated community of practice, which has been strengthened through annual inter-agency practitioners' workshops, bringing together expertise from within and outside the United Nations system, for exchange of experience and knowledge, policy discussion and training. To develop a common understanding of and approach to security sector reform, the Task Force developed a number of sensitization and training products. These have been delivered to more than 600 representatives of Task Force member entities, Member States and partner institutions in more than 17 countries.

Operational roles: supporting national and regional security sector reform processes

26. Considerable progress has been made in fulfilling the operational roles highlighted in the report of 2008. While it is not feasible to provide an exhaustive list of United Nations security sector reform support activities over the past five

[12] The notes are available from the website of the Security Sector Reform Task Force (http://unssr.unlb.org/).

[13] The United Nations Group of Friends of Security Sector Reform (see para. 42 below) serves as an interface between the United Nations system and Member States to foster dialogue on the United Nations engagement in support of security sector reform. The Group of Friends has 36 members.

[14] The outcome documents of the meeting are available from http://unssr.unlb.org/.

years, this section offers examples of the type of assistance that the Organization is providing to national processes.

Needs assessment and strategic planning

27. In support of the development of national security policies, strategies and plans, United Nations entities have provided technical, legal and political assistance in different contexts. Central to these initiatives has been the focus on comprehensive needs assessments and reviews in order to build an empirical evidence base to inform reform processes. For example, in Guinea, the United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA), the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) undertook an assessment of the security sector in 2010, conducted under the auspices of ECOWAS and the African Union, with the support of the Peacebuilding Fund. This exercise provided the foundation for the national security sector reform process launched a year later. In 2010, the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti and United Nations agencies supported the Haitian National Police in undertaking a joint security assessment and elaborating a strategic policing plan to enhance the security in camps for internally displaced people. Also in 2010, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) published a report assessing the problems posed by transnational organized crime around the globe; it subsequently launched a series of regional and thematic threat assessments in the area of transnational organized crime, informing security sector reform programming in a number of countries. In 2011, the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) assisted national authorities in completing a comprehensive review of the security sector, which informed the Government's security sector reform planning. In 2012, in Tunisia, UNDP assisted the Ministry of the Interior in undertaking a baseline study of the reforms required to improve security services to the population. In Papua New Guinea, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and UNDP supported a human rights assessment of the police force which included recommendations on institutional reform, capacity-building and accountability.

28. In Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, Somalia, South Sudan and Timor-Leste, United Nations missions have provided extensive support to the national authorities in developing national security and security sector reform strategies, policies and plans, which provide the basis for long-term reform. In the Comoros, the Office for Disarmament Affairs assisted in the development of a strategic plan for the national police, including guidelines and a code of conduct on the use of force and firearms. In addition, through various United Nations strategic planning mechanisms, including the integrated strategic frameworks, such assessments and reviews have helped to link security sector reform with other priorities and United Nations efforts, including in the areas of peacebuilding, national reconciliation, justice and corrections reform, transitional justice, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, small arms and light weapons control, reduction of community violence and community security initiatives.

Facilitating national dialogue

29. The United Nations can play a key role in facilitating dialogue among national and local authorities, security sector institutions, civil society, and the broader population. This often contributes to a more cohesive, transparent and legitimate security vision, laying the foundation for the transformation of the security sector. In

diverse contexts such as the Central African Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Libya, South Sudan and Timor-Leste, the United Nations, often in partnership with other international actors, has supported dialogue processes on issues related to security sector reform. For example, in Guinea-Bissau, the United Nations supported a national consultation, which convened the leadership of State institutions and representatives of civil society to address criminal justice aspects of the national security sector reform process. The United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) facilitates monthly interactions between State officials, political parties and civil society to improve information-sharing and dialogue. Nevertheless, the United Nations, given its political neutrality and universal coverage, could do more to assist Member States in this area by demonstrating its value added in facilitating inclusive dialogue processes and better communicating this comparative advantage to its partners.

Capacity-building for oversight mechanisms

30. Assisting national authorities with the development of executive and legislative oversight mechanisms has been a key priority for the Organization over the past few years. For example, in Burundi, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, South Sudan and Timor-Leste, the United Nations has provided extensive support to the elaboration of security legislation, as well capacity-building assistance to enhance parliamentary oversight. In Sierra Leone, the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone and OHCHR supported the national authorities in creating an external police oversight mechanism. In Colombia, OHCHR assisted with the development of a legal framework on intelligence functioning and the establishment of a parliamentary intelligence oversight committee. In Timor-Leste, the United Nations assisted the legislature in developing a mechanism for oversight of the intelligence services. In Guinea-Bissau and Liberia, the United Nations helped to review legal frameworks and national policies in order to enhance civilian oversight of the armed forces and law enforcement institutions. The United Nations Mission in South Sudan has supported the establishment of a national oversight coordination mechanism and provided capacity-building to its members. In Turkey, UNDP is leading the implementation of a European Union-funded project to improve civilian oversight of the security sector. This has contributed to fostering a common understanding of civilian oversight and management, emphasizing the role of the Ministry of the Interior, governors and district governors. In Central and West Africa, the Office for Disarmament Affairs has contributed to the organization of a series of workshops for parliamentarians on issues of small arms and light weapons in support of broader security sector reform efforts.

31. Strengthening the capacity of civil society to support effective civilian oversight has been a priority. In Nepal, OHCHR provided capacity-building and technical assistance to a civil society network that monitored security forces during public protests and provided recommendations on their performance. The United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) has supported a civil society network on security sector reform and justice to formulate inclusive policy recommendations on security sector reform in the country. In Liberia, Haiti, Timor-Leste and Uganda, UN-Women has supported community-based women's organizations in holding routine forums with security actors to identify security threats and mitigating actions. This has proved to

be an effective strategy for increasing the responsiveness of security institutions to the threats faced by women and girls, as well as increasing women's contribution to solving security problems.

Provision of technical advice and support

32. Over the past five years, most peacekeeping operations and special political missions, as well as United Nations country teams engaged in security sector reform, have provided specialized expertise to national authorities on the reform of components of the security sector, including defence, relevant elements of the justice and corrections sectors, and institutions responsible for border management, customs, civil emergencies, and crime prevention, among others. In Timor-Leste, UNMIT assisted the Secretary of State for Defence and the Army Commander in strategic defence planning and policy-shaping, and trained Timorese Defence Force personnel in maritime security concepts. In Colombia, OHCHR advised the Ministry of Defence on and monitored the implementation of internal control measures for the prevention of human rights violations by the military in the context of the internal armed conflict. The United Nations Support Mission in Libya, in collaboration with the Libyan authorities and in coordination with the international community, continues to support the development of Libya's strategic security vision through the project known as "Towards a Defence White Paper", which aims to lay the groundwork for future reform of the country's defence sector.

33. In West Africa, the joint West Africa Coast Initiative[15] aims at enhancing the capacity of Member States to respond to transnational organized crime and illicit trafficking in Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Sierra Leone.[16] In East Africa, UNODC is supporting regional efforts to prosecute suspected pirates apprehended off the coast of Somalia. States with naval forces active in the region have concluded transfer agreements with regional actors such as Kenya and Seychelles for the prosecution of suspected pirates in their national legal systems. In Guatemala, a joint security sector reform initiative of UNDP, UNODC and UN-Women, supported by the Peacebuilding Fund, has resulted in the establishment of a Human Trafficking Unit within the Attorney General's Office and the initiation of a training programme for its officers. This initiative has enhanced the ability of law enforcement institutions to investigate crime scenes, collect evidence and respond to cases of trafficking. In the Central African Republic, the United Nations is supporting the reform of police and gendarmerie functions in the areas of human rights and gender. In Guinea-Bissau, the Organization is assisting in vetting processes, and in Egypt support focuses on sharing good practice on policing.

34. Increased emphasis has also been placed on the political economy of security sector reform, to address the affordability and sustainability of reforms. Recent examples include innovative work on reviews of public expenditure in the security sector by the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and the World Bank between 2011 and 2012, with assistance from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, as well as UNDP support to enhance public financial management in Guinea. In South Sudan, the United Nations and international partners have

[15] This initiative is supported by the Departments of Political Affairs and Peacekeeping Operations, UNODC, the United Nations Office for West Africa and the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL).

[16] It will also include Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea in the course of 2013.

supported the security budget sector working group. In 2011, UNODC launched the Tools and Resources for Anti-Corruption Knowledge (TRACK) initiative. This web-based anti-corruption portal brings together legal and non-legal knowledge on anti-corruption and asset recovery, enabling government officials, practitioners and the general public to access such information in a user-friendly way.

35. Demand for highly specialized technical assistance and cooperation is also apparent in other areas, such as gender and small arms control. For example, in 2009, the Office of the Special Adviser on Africa, in partnership with members of the Inter-Agency Task Force on Africa, and in close cooperation with the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM)[17] and the Security Sector Reform Unit in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, organized a seminar on security sector reform and the protection of women, resulting in a set of recommendations for the inclusion of women and gender issues in the United Nations support for security sector reform, informed by resolution 1325 (2000) on women and peace and security. In Guinea, the Niger and Togo, the Office for Disarmament Affairs Regional Centre has trained over 400 security personnel on the principles of use of force and firearms, human rights and international humanitarian law, in cooperation with OHCHR, UNDP and the International Committee of the Red Cross. In Latin America and the Caribbean, the Office's Regional Centre has trained over 4,000 police, border, customs and judicial officers on small arms control. In addition, a partnership of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Office for Disarmament Affairs on arms embargo monitoring has assisted the United Nations police, UNOCI and UNMIL with the provision of practical tools and training in line with international standards.[18]

Coordination and resource mobilization

36. Support to national and regional authorities in the mobilization of resources and coordination of external assistance for security sector reform constitutes an important operational role for the United Nations. In Nepal, the United Nations Mission in Nepal supported national coordination efforts by holding regular coordination meetings. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, MONUSCO is supporting the Ministry of Planning in developing matrices to facilitate the coordination of international security sector reform assistance. However, as demonstrated in a number of contexts, one of the main challenges to effective coordination is the reluctance on the part of some international partners to share information on their support to security sector reform. This may be driven by a divergence of interests between partners or a preference on the part of host Governments to engage partners on a bilateral basis.

37. Through its strategic partnership with the African Union on security sector reform, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations is assisting the African Union Commission in mobilizing resources for a 30-month capacity-building programme. In Timor-Leste, a joint Department of Peacekeeping Operations-UNDP team helped the national authorities to leverage resources to build the capacity of a number of security institutions. The United Nations Office in Burundi is currently supporting the Commission on Civilian Disarmament and Combating the Proliferation of Light and Small Calibre Arms to mobilize resources for the second civilian disarmament

[17] The United Nations Development Fund for Women is now part of UN-Women.

[18] International Ammunition Technical Guidelines and International Small Arms Control Standards.

campaign. In Somalia, in 2009, the United Nations established a trust fund in support of the Somali transitional security institutions, which has generated more than $25 million since its establishment.

Monitoring, evaluation and review

38. Supporting national and international partners in monitoring, evaluating and reviewing the progress of reform is an area of growing importance. In Côte d'Ivoire, UNOCI is supporting the National Security Council secretariat in developing indicators and benchmarks to monitor the implementation of the national security sector reform strategy. In 2008, in Liberia, UNMIL helped the country's security institutions to develop a national security implementation matrix to provide a common basis for coordination, monitoring and evaluation of security sector reform interventions. Human rights monitoring has proved to be key in assessing and monitoring the impact of security sector reform in some contexts. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan has, since 2010, monitored and reported on the treatment of conflict-related detainees in Afghan custody. That reporting has become an authoritative source of information and analysis for the international community, in particular with respect to reform initiatives targeting the National Directorate for Security.

Security sector reform capacities

39. To implement the operational roles outlined in the report of 2008, the Organization has increased its field capacities. The number of dedicated security sector reform teams in peacekeeping operations and special political missions has increased from 3 in 2007 to 11 today. Other missions are mandated to undertake or support tasks related to security sector reform but do not include a dedicated security sector reform capacity. At the request of the national authorities, the United Nations has co-located security sector reform advisers in key government offices in Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, South Sudan and Timor-Leste.

40. In line with the recommendation in the previous report to create a United Nations inter-agency security sector reform support unit, hosted by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, to assist the Organization in linking the different and interrelated components of security in order to deliver coherent and coordinated support to national security sector reform processes (A/62/659-S/2008/39, para. 60), the Security Sector Reform Unit, within the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions of the Department, was established in 2009. The Unit acts as the secretariat to the Security Sector Reform Task Force and serves as the focal point and technical resource capacity on security sector reform for the United Nations system and national and international partners (see ST/SGB/2010/1). Given this mandate, the Unit supports both peacekeeping operations and special political missions with security sector reform mandates, as well as peacebuilding offices, in close coordination with partners in the Secretariat, in particular the Department of Political Affairs and the Peacebuilding Support Office. The Unit provides technical assistance to other actors, such as the African Union, involved in assisting national and regional security sector reform efforts. In its reports for 2010, 2011 and 2012, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations noted its appreciation for the efforts of the Security Sector Reform Unit since its establishment in 2009 (see A/64/19, A/65/19 and A/66/19).

41. In my last report I identified the development of adequate human resources capacity as a particular challenge given the relative global shortage of expertise in security sector reform. Over the past five years, capacity has been bolstered through the development of standardized job descriptions and staff rosters for security sector reform. Furthermore, the creation of the United Nations roster of security sector reform experts, early in 2010, has enhanced our ability to respond to requests for short-term support. The roster provides a geographically diverse and gender-balanced pool of senior, pre-screened, qualified experts in over 20 areas of expertise for rapid deployment upon request for security sector reform assistance. Roster experts have been deployed to support, inter alia, security sector assessments, the development of project documents, the organization or facilitation of seminars, or the evaluation of security sector reform programmes in contexts such as the Comoros, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Liberia, Nepal and Somalia. Unfortunately, despite the high demand for the roster, a number of requests have not been fulfilled, owing to the lack of dedicated resources for its management and the deployment of its experts.[19]

Working with partners: building partnerships with Member States, regional organizations and civil society

42. Much has been achieved regarding the recommendation in the earlier report to build partnerships to provide effective support, expertise and adequate resources to national security sector reform processes. The informal United Nations Group of Friends of Security Sector Reform, established in 2007 at the initiative of the Government of Slovakia, has proved vital in helping to develop a consensus on the United Nations security sector reform agenda. The Group of Friends is now co-chaired by the Governments of Slovakia and South Africa, with the possibility that the co-chair position occupied by South Africa may rotate between different African Member States. The Security Sector Reform Unit has also facilitated and provided technical support to the emergence of similar groupings of Member States, notably the High-level Forum on African Perspectives on Security Sector Reform, co-chaired by the Governments of Nigeria and South Africa. First convened in 2010, then again in 2012, the forum has become an established mechanism for regular discussion of African perspectives. Late in 2012, it was decided that the forum would be folded into the activities of the Group of Friends. This will help to facilitate consensus-building on security sector reform-related issues among a diverse group of Member States.

43. The Security Sector Reform Task Force has taken steps to build partnerships with regional organizations and to support the development of regional priorities and frameworks. In September 2009, UNDP, in collaboration with the Governments of Argentina and Slovakia, organized a workshop for Latin America in Buenos Aires.[20] In March 2010, the Governments of Indonesia and Slovakia included

[19] Since the launch of the United Nations roster of security sector reform experts, 15 requests for assistance have been received on average per year. Unfortunately, despite the high demand for the roster, no dedicated resources for its management and the deployment of its experts exist. As a result, only nine requests, or 19 per cent, have been fulfilled, primarily through voluntary contributions from Member States.

[20] International workshop on contributing to the United Nations approach to security sector reform: insights from Latin America and the Caribbean.

security sector reform as a major item in a workshop for South-East Asia, held in Jakarta.[21]

44. Since 2009, the African Union Commission and the United Nations, represented by the Security Sector Reform Unit, have developed a strategic partnership on security sector reform, which aims to assist the African Union with the elaboration of its recently adopted policy framework on security sector reform and to simultaneously build the Commission's capacities to implement the framework through a multi-year capacity-building programme. Launched in January 2013, the capacity-building programme is being implemented in partnership with the European Union, while substantive, technical and programme services support is provided by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the United Nations Office to the African Union, the African Security Sector Network and the United Nations Office for Project Services. This unique partnership was welcomed by the Security Council in its presidential statement of 2011. The Council encouraged other regions to consider establishing such partnerships in order to better facilitate the exchange of lessons learned and best practices, as well as develop regional frameworks for security sector reform support, reflecting the participation of regional and subregional organizations (see S/PRST/2011/19).

45. The United Nations has developed working partnerships with other multilateral organizations, think tanks and civil society networks. UNDP and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations are working with the World Bank to develop a sourcebook on security sector public expenditure reviews. The Organization's partnership with the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces has been instrumental in the preparation of the Integrated Technical Guidance Notes and the thematic review of security sector reform and peacebuilding,[22] as well as the exchange of good practices and lessons learned. The African Security Sector Network has been a key partner of the United Nations in providing support to the African Union and in the facilitation of policy dialogues, including within the framework of the High-level Forum on African Perspectives.

Developing a coherent United Nations approach to security sector reform: the inter-agency Security Sector Reform Task Force

46. One of the core observations in my report of 2008 was that, despite the United Nations extensive experience in supporting national security sector reform efforts, the Organization lacked a system-wide approach for delivering coherent assistance in this area. In some contexts, it also lacked capacities and resources. Accordingly, I called on the United Nations system to build on efforts to develop system-wide coherence and coordination in the provision of support to security sector reform that were already under way.

47. As part of the broader effort to foster system-wide coherence, I established, in 2007, the inter-agency Security Sector Reform Task Force, whose membership has doubled from 7 to 14 since its creation.[23] This expanding membership is a reflection of the increasing demand for support and specialized expertise in security sector reform across the Organization. While the Department of Peacekeeping Operations

[21] International workshop on the role of the United Nations in peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding: towards an ASEAN perspective.

[22] See footnote 27.

[23] See footnote 2 for a list of the entities that make up the Security Sector Reform Task Force.

has chaired the Task Force for most of the past five years, it is now co-chaired by the Department and UNDP. Between 2008 and 2012, the members of the Task Force implemented a multi-year capacity-building programme with funding from voluntary contributions of Member States. The Task Force has enhanced its efforts to develop joint programmes and initiatives, including joint assessments and strategies, in order to strengthen coordination and collaboration in the field. For example, in this framework, and upon a request from the Peacebuilding Support Office, the Department of Political Affairs and UNOWA, the Task Force established a sub-working group on Guinea in mid-2011. The sub-working group, which is co-chaired by the Department of Political Affairs and UNDP, provides a forum for discussion on Guinea to supplement ongoing efforts in the country and ensure a coherent approach by all actors.

48. Through its extensive work in developing much-needed guidance and in creating a common forum on security sector reform, the Task Force and its secretariat have established themselves as important sources of expertise. Indeed, in its presidential statement of 12 October 2011, the Security Council commended the efforts of the United Nations, in particular the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, including the Security Sector Reform Unit and the inter-agency Security Sector Reform Task Force, in further strengthening a comprehensive United Nations approach to security sector reform, through the development of guidance and civilian capacities, coordination mechanisms, and collaboration with regional and subregional organizations, in particular the African Union (see S/PRST/2011/19). In its reports for 2011 and 2012, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations expressed appreciation of the work done through the Security Sector Reform Unit's leadership of the inter-agency Security Sector Reform Task Force (see A/65/19 and A/66/19). The Task Force is also working towards further enhancing its collaboration with the Rule of Law Coordination and Resource Group.

49. Other mechanisms and initiatives to enhance coherence include the Peacebuilding Commission's country-specific configurations,[24] which seek to strengthen the coordination and delivery of support at the country level, including in the area of security sector reform. Efforts at Headquarters include the appointment, in September 2012, of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and UNDP as the joint global focal point for the police, justice and corrections areas in the rule of law in post-conflict and other crisis situations,[25] which seeks to strengthen the Organization's ability to fill critical civilian capacity gaps and facilitate the provision of joint support to national authorities in these areas. In the case of support to peacekeeping operations, the Task Force works closely with the integrated operational teams in the Office of Operations of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. This ensures the provision of integrated support and advice to the missions.

[24] There are currently six country-specific configurations, concerning Burundi, the Central African Republic, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Sierra Leone.

[25] OHCHR will join the co-location established by UNDP and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to operationalize the global focal point at Headquarters.

IV. Remaining challenges

50. The Organization is developing a common understanding and coordinated approach to security sector reform across the United Nations system and is fulfilling many of the roles outlined in the report of 2008. More work needs to be done, however. We have learned that the success or failure of security sector reform efforts depends on the political environment in which reform is carried out. Contexts such as the Central African Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, Somalia or Timor-Leste illustrate that security sector reform needs to be linked to broader political reforms that create the foundations for transformative processes such as national dialogues, reconciliation efforts or transitional justice initiatives. In the absence of these foundations, security sector reform is neither sustainable nor transformative.

51. Political space, leadership and commitment are a precondition for and a manifestation of national ownership, which is one of the key principles highlighted in the last report. The guidance note on national ownership, prepared by the Task Force, provides a clear definition of the concept and outlines practical steps on how to support security sector reform on the basis of national ownership. Ensuring that security sector reform processes reflect the host Government's primary role, while promoting inclusiveness, remains a key challenge for operationalizing national ownership. This may require moving beyond a narrow partnership with formal authorities towards a whole-of-society approach, with a particular focus on engaging civil society, including women and vulnerable groups, bearing in mind the important role played by informal justice and security providers in many contexts.

52. Security sector reform processes are often externally funded, thereby undermining sustainability and full ownership. In a number of contexts, including Guinea, Liberia and Timor-Leste, we have been reminded that national ownership also requires, to the extent possible, the allocation of national resources to the reform process on a systematic basis, through relevant appropriative and legislative authorities.

53. The Security Council can play a key role in enhancing national ownership by taking additional steps to ensure that its mandates more visibly incorporate the perspectives of the countries under consideration. This can be achieved by engaging national authorities more systematically in mandate discussions. Experience has shown that the successful implementation of Security Council mandates depends, to a large extent, on the degree to which the mandates respond to national concerns and needs.

54. Another lesson learned is that successful transformation of the security sector transcends changes in individual components of the sector such as the police, army, border control, coast guard and civil emergencies services, which seek to enhance the capacities, effectiveness and professionalism of security providers. Critically, the Organization and Member States have come to appreciate the importance of sector-wide initiatives that have a transformative impact and address the strategic, governance and architectural framework of the sector.[26] As noted in the previous section, the United Nations is increasingly providing assistance in this area. In many contexts, the Organization may have a comparative advantage relative to other

[26] See footnote 10.

partners in providing sector-wide support, but the resources to deliver this support remain inadequate. For example, in its thematic review of security sector reform and peacebuilding in 2012, the Peacebuilding Support Office concluded that the support efforts of the Peacebuilding Fund in "software" areas such as institutional governance or oversight were marginal in relation to the resources dedicated to "hardware" priorities such as infrastructure, training and equipment.[27] There is also a growing recognition that the United Nations role in security sector reform is both a distinct discipline with specific expertise to engage at the sector-wide level and an integrative function, whose primary raison d'être is to enable or facilitate coherence and coordination among various United Nations and, in some contexts, non-United Nations actors engaged in security sector reform.

55. In order to create basic trust between citizens and State institutions, and to begin to address social contract deficits, security institutions must improve the quality of the security services they provide to the public. This requires a clear focus on the ultimate objective of increasing people's security and safety which, in turn, necessitates an inclusive dialogue and the participation of communities and civil society organizations, including women's groups. Accordingly, the United Nations support to national security sector reform efforts should continue to ensure improved security through initiatives that support longer-term reform, violence prevention and conflict transformation. At the same time, such support must assist in facilitating immediate security service delivery through, for example, community-oriented policing, justice delivery and small arms and light weapons control. The United Nations must also promote accountability measures to address past and present human rights violations in accordance with international human rights law and standards.

56. To meet these multiple requirements, security sector reform activities and expertise need to be linked to a broader set of practice areas. These include respect for and protection of human rights for individuals and groups at risk, gendered security analysis, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, control of small arms and light weapons, community-based approaches, reduction of armed violence, and public financial management in the security sector. Attention must also be paid to anti-corruption measures given the risks corruption poses to the viability and sustainability of any reform. The successful implementation of a protection of civilians mandate depends largely on medium- to long-term accomplishments in the area of security sector reform. Effective security sector reform is also key to the prevention, response to and eradication of gender-based violence, including conflict-related sexual violence.

57. Monitoring and evaluation can be a challenging undertaking. Partners do not always share a common appreciation of the fact that qualitative impact, such as an increase in the trust and confidence of individuals and communities in security institutions, is often long term in nature and difficult to measure. Qualitative elements are often much more significant, however, than visible quantitative changes, which are measured, for example, by the number of personnel trained or

[27] According to the thematic review of security sector reform and peacebuilding, 93 per cent of the resources allocated by the Peacebuilding Fund had been directed towards infrastructure, training and equipment and operations support, whereas only 7 per cent had been allocated to general security sector reform. The review is available from www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pbso/pdf/SSR2_web.pdf.

buildings rehabilitated. The United Nations must do more to enhance its monitoring and evaluation capacities and ensure that comprehensive approaches build on national development priorities and broader international frameworks.

58. The United Nations is usually one of several actors providing support to security sector reform and has made important progress in expanding and deepening partnerships, particularly with regional and subregional organizations. While partnerships have been most prominent with the African Union and regional economic communities on the African continent, there is a recognition that more could be done in other regions.

59. There has been a significant increase in the number and type of actors providing support to security sector reform, in addition to changes in the nature of support. More Member States are now providing assistance than five years ago, including many that were previously beneficiaries of such support. However, as recognized by Member States, including during the High-level Forums on African Perspectives on Security Sector Reform of 2010 and 2012, the expertise and experiences of these horizontal partnerships are inadequately captured by prevailing policy discourse and practice.[28] The United Nations Civilian Capacities Initiative represents an important step forward and the pool of security sector reform expertise must continue to be enlarged. It is often challenging, moreover, to ensure the provision of technical expertise and resources when requested. The United Nations roster of security sector reform experts provides a promising source of rapidly deployable, geographically diverse expertise but dedicated funding is required to optimize its functioning.

60. The Security Sector Reform Task Force has proved to be a highly effective coordination mechanism, providing a common platform for the formulation and implementation of various policy and guidance frameworks. It will need to further enhance its support to United Nations field presences in developing joint strategies, programmes and resource mobilization initiatives. It must also continue to link strategic and operational guidance from Headquarters to results in the field. Notwithstanding the results the Task Force has achieved, the sustainability and predictability of its work continue to be challenged by its entire dependence on extrabudgetary support, including for the functioning of its secretariat.

V. Lessons learned and recommendations on the way forward

61. Over the past five years, the United Nations has made considerable progress in addressing the deficits highlighted in the report of 2008, in line with the guidance offered by the General Assembly and the Security Council. This includes the elaboration of technical guidance and policies to enhance delivery of support to national security sector reform processes, and the establishment of specialized capacities in the field and at United Nations Headquarters to better respond to requests from Member States and Security Council mandates. System-wide coherence and coordination have been improved, including through the concerted efforts of the inter-agency Security Sector Reform Task Force, and partnerships

[28] See the final report of the High-level Forum on African Perspectives on Security Sector Reform, of May 2010, available from http://unssr.unlb.org/Resources/UNSSRPublications/tabid/204/SMID/498/Itemid/113/Default.aspx.

have been forged with Member State forums, civil society and subregional and regional organizations, including the African Union. The remaining challenges suggest that the Organization, its Member States and other partners should focus on addressing a number of core issues in order to further strengthen the United Nations comprehensive approach to supporting national security sector reform efforts, as set out below:

(a) National ownership of security sector reform processes must be inclusive as this increases the confidence in and legitimacy of security institutions, and ensures that security efforts respond to national security concerns as well as local needs. **Member States undertaking reform are therefore encouraged to firmly take the lead in defining a broad-based national vision on security sector reform, informed by the needs and aspirations of the population. In defining this vision, Member States should apply a holistic, participatory and transparent approach to security sector reform, based on an inclusive dialogue process among and between authorities at various levels, from all branches of government and security sector institutions, national human rights institutions, civil society, especially women's groups and child protection advocates, and other non-State actors, while continuing to reflect and reinforce the host Government's primary role. Entities in the Security Sector Reform Task Force stand ready to support these initiatives. There is also a need to better understand and address the role of non-State actors in the provision of security and support to security sector reform more broadly.**

(b) Sustainable national ownership also requires the commitment of human and financial resources to the security sector reform process. **To ensure the long-term sustainability and viability of reforms, Member States undergoing reform should strive to allocate adequate national resources, including through relevant legislative authorities, to the reform process. At the same time, international partners, including the international financial institutions, are encouraged to dedicate sufficient short- and long-term assistance to the security sector, where needed.**

(c) With specific regard to peacekeeping and peacebuilding, Security Council and General Assembly mandates for peacekeeping operations and special political missions offer an important entry point for ensuring the practical application of the principle of national ownership. **I encourage the Security Council and the General Assembly to prioritize early involvement of national stakeholders in negotiations on the security sector reform-related dimensions of their resolutions. Particular efforts should be made to ensure that provisions relating to security sector reform are better tailored to respond to specific national contexts and challenges.**

(d) Support to national security sector reform processes is being provided in rapidly changing contexts of security which will require that the Organization changes or adjusts the tools it uses to respond to threats so that security sector reform efforts contribute in a meaningful way to ensuring that people are safer. **Notwithstanding the continued importance of assisting Member States in building the capacity and institutional framework of their security sector, the United Nations support should emphasize initiatives that address people's immediate security needs. This requires working closely with national authorities to extend security service delivery, while building on existing local**

initiatives and forming partnerships with communities to ensure the security and safety of the population.

(e) Successful security sector reform is predicated on a combination of reform of individual components of the security sector — such as the police, army, intelligence services, border control agencies, coast guard and civil emergencies services — and sector-wide initiatives that address the strategic, policy and architectural framework of the sector. The United Nations is particularly well positioned to support such reforms and often has a comparative advantage at the sector-wide level. **The Security Sector Reform Task Force will explore ways to strengthen the linkages between sector-wide initiatives and component-specific interventions for a more comprehensive and integrated approach to security sector reform. This will necessitate enhanced capacities to support strategic-level reforms that encompass the entire sector in a systemic manner.**

(f) Additional attention should be given to enhancing coherence through a common understanding and appreciation of, as well as response to, the United Nations role in sector-wide and component-level reform, both within the Organization and with its bilateral and multilateral partners. **The Security Sector Reform Task Force will develop a system-wide training and sensitization programme, including on the Integrated Technical Guidance Notes. These initiatives will cut across the United Nations system and be tailored to a variety of audiences, including senior management. In the related and specific area of defence sector reform, particular efforts will be made to ensure that the United Nations policy on defence sector reform is operationalized as an integral part, and within the broader framework, of security sector reform. In this regard, the Security Sector Reform Unit will, as a matter of priority and in close coordination with the Office of Military Affairs in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, conduct a mapping of mission-specific needs, develop guidance notes and provide training to personnel in the field. The Human Rights Due Diligence Policy on United Nations Support to Non-United Nations Security Forces will be fully disseminated and operationalized to support the sustainability and strengthening of national capacity to address human rights challenges within security sector reform efforts.**

(g) The international community has learned that security sector reform is both a distinct discipline and an integrative function, and that the work of the United Nations in this vital area entails delivering on both of these roles. However, much more needs to be done to clarify and capacitate the integrative role of the United Nations. **It is necessary to position security sector reform capacities within United Nations missions, or country teams in particular configurations, to allow the operationalization of this dual role. Recognizing that security sector reform is a strategic function, it should be considered an integral part of the good offices role of my special representatives.**

(h) Security sector reform needs to be better linked to other critical practice areas such as reduction of armed violence, control of small arms and light weapons, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, security sector public financial management, respect for and protection of human rights for individuals and groups at risk, gendered security analysis, and the prevention, response to and eradication of gender-based violence, including conflict-related sexual violence. **The Security Sector Reform Task Force will develop guidance on how relevant practice areas**

can be normatively and operationally integrated into or linked to the United Nations approach to security sector reform. The United Nations will also focus on supporting Member States in designing security sector reform programmes that are responsive to the specific needs of women and girls, in line with the guidance note on gender-responsive security sector reform. Emphasis will also be placed on developing training curricula, codes of conduct, and operational doctrines to prevent sexual and gender-based violence, in close collaboration with relevant line ministries, and United Nations entities concerned with reproductive health, gender-based violence and related fields, including conflict-related sexual violence.

(i) The growing complexity of security sector reform processes and the interlinkages between security sector reform and other practice areas require the alignment of capacities and resources. The Task Force has a special role to play in assisting its individual entities at the country level in the design and implementation of joint programmes that respond to national priorities. **The Security Sector Reform Task Force will advise United Nations field presences, including peacekeeping operations, special political missions and United Nations country teams, on joint strategies, programmes and resource mobilization initiatives, with a view to strengthening coordination and effective delivery at the country level, in accordance with the integrated assessment and planning policy and national frameworks. Such initiatives should address both long-term institutional reforms and people's immediate safety and security needs. To further enhance coordination and coherence, working arrangements will be considered for the prospective use of existing funding mechanisms of Task Force members, including the Peacebuilding Fund, to support joint strategies and programmes.**

(j) Measuring the impact of security sector reform programmes is a complex process that is intrinsically linked to national ownership. Monitoring and evaluation frameworks, including indicators, benchmarks, targets and objectives, should therefore fit into overarching national planning frameworks such as security, peacebuilding, transitional justice and development plans, and must clearly assess the impact of security sector reform interventions on gender, protection of civilians and other related areas. **It is imperative for Member States and the Security Sector Reform Task Force to further strengthen comprehensive monitoring and evaluation approaches for security sector reform, taking into account the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States. In doing so, it is important to remain mindful of the challenges in measuring results and impact in this area, while continuing to exercise flexibility and maintaining a long-term perspective. Task Force members will also ensure that the Organization's planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation in the area of security sector reform are closely aligned to security sector priorities in national planning frameworks, such as security, peacebuilding, transitional justice and development plans.**

(k) Human rights monitoring has proved to be crucial in identifying institutional risk factors and ensuring that security sector reform strategies guarantee the full respect for human rights by security sector institutions undergoing reform and their accountability in this regard. **Where the United Nations has such a mandate, the results of human rights monitoring should be integrated into**

security sector reform planning to ensure that individuals continue to be the ultimate and direct beneficiaries of security sector reform efforts.

(l) Security sector reform partnerships are vital to ensure the provision of necessary expertise, resources and political support to international and national efforts. I welcome the adoption, by African Union member States, of the first continental policy framework on security sector reform. It is also encouraging that the African Union and the United Nations have developed a strategic partnership to implement this framework with the support of the European Union and other donors. This could serve as a useful model for normative development and partnerships with other regional and subregional organizations. **United Nations entities, within the framework of the Security Sector Reform Task Force, will work closely with regional and subregional organizations to support the development of security sector reform frameworks that build on regional perspectives and take into account transnational security issues, as well as helping to build professional and accountable security sectors, as requested. I encourage United Nations entities and Member States to continue to establish partnerships and work closely with civil society networks, think tanks and other actors to ensure that good practices and lessons learned are used to consistently improve the provision of support to security sector reform.**

(m) Member State initiatives, such as the United Nations Group of Friends of Security Sector Reform, initiated by the Government of Slovakia, and the High-level Forum on African Perspectives on Security Sector Reform, co-chaired by Nigeria and South Africa, provide important forums for inclusive dialogue within the United Nations system. **I call on Member States, in particular the Peacebuilding Commission and the United Nations Group of Friends of Security Sector Reform, to continue to be engaged and to facilitate strategic discussions on strengthening the United Nations approach in this critical area.**

(n) Many Member States have their own rich expertise and experiences in security sector reform which deserve to be shared, including through an increase in South-South exchange. **It would be important for the Organization to actively take advantage of the CAPMATCH platform and explore the interoperability of existing rosters, including the United Nations roster of security sector reform experts. I encourage Member States to utilize the roster and to provide financial and technical resources to enable the deployment of expertise from the roster.**

(o) The Security Sector Reform Task Force and its secretariat, the Security Sector Reform Unit of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, have solidly emerged as important sources of expertise on security sector reform. However, the current allocation of capacities and resources remains inadequate relative to the breadth of responsibilities and requests. The Organization therefore needs to enhance the capacities of these entities to enable them to meet their operational mandate, particularly with respect to enhanced delivery of field support. **I urge Member States to ensure that the Security Sector Reform Task Force and its secretariat are provided with the necessary resources to play their mandated role in promoting an effective, coherent and well-coordinated approach in this crucial area.**

VI. Conclusions

62. My report of 2008 on security sector reform was prepared on the basis of the recognition that, while the United Nations had engaged in supporting national efforts, the Organization lacked the methodology, resources and capacities, as well as common principles, standards and guidance to deliver a system-wide approach in support of security sector reform processes at the national and regional levels. The report put forward a number of recommendations to respond to those deficits, focusing on normative development, operational roles, building partnerships and enhancing coherence.

63. Today, security sector reform is acknowledged by the Security Council and the General Assembly as a central component of the Organization's peacekeeping, peacebuilding and development agendas. The establishment and consolidation of the Security Sector Reform Task Force has been an important accomplishment through which mechanisms, policies and guidance have been developed to provide common norms and standards for the United Nations and its partners. Security sector reform capacities have been established in the field and at Headquarters which have allowed a better response to the increasing requests from Member States and mandates of the Security Council. These capacities are providing extensive and diverse support in security sector reform-related areas, including mapping and needs assessments, building governance and oversight capacities, and direct support to components of the security sector. The development of a United Nations roster of security sector reform experts has resulted in rapidly deployable and flexible expertise to meet new and complex demands. Regular mechanisms for dialogue on policy have also been established and partnerships are being continuously strengthened with regional organizations, individual Member States, civil society networks, and other key stakeholders.

64. These achievements have helped to ensure that the Organization's approach to security sector reform is becoming increasingly focused on delivering comprehensive and coordinated support to national authorities on the basis of common principles and guidance. This report, including the recommendations contained in section V above, highlights how the United Nations, Member States and partners can further support security sector reform by encouraging inclusive and sustainable national ownership; promoting security service delivery; building capacities for reform that better link component-specific and sector-wide initiatives; expanding and deepening partnerships; encouraging dialogue and knowledge-sharing; and further enhancing inter-agency coherence and coordination.

65. I am confident that if the Organization takes these recommendations forward, together with Member States and other partners, we will be even better placed to support effective and accountable security institutions capable of securing States and societies and, in the final analysis, enhancing peace, security and development for all.